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Introduzione
Un numero generato senza possedere alcuna caratteristica specifica e` chiamato numero
casuale. Questi numeri sono utilizzati per molteplici scopi. Ricoprono un ruolo fon-
damentale nel garantire assoluta segretezza di un sistema nel campo della crittografia.
L’affidabilita` e l’esecuzione nell’ambiente digitale del mondo moderno si poggiano sul
grado di casualita` che si e` in grado di creare. I numeri sono anche usati nelle comu-
nicazioni e nell’informatica, i.e. simulazioni Monte Carlo, predizioni finanziarie, test di
biofisica e medicina nucleare, ed in molti altri campi. Sono utili anche per applicazioni
prettamente commerciali come la lotteria, slot machines e trasmissioni wireless. [1, 2]
Un True Random Number Generator (TRNG) e` matematicamente definito come un
generatore che produce numeri, estratti da un insieme con N elementi, con probabilita`
1/N. Per assicurare che un numero sia effettivamente casuale, esso deve possedere due
proprieta` fondamentali: uniformita` ed imprevedibilita` statistica. La prima richiede che
i valori casuali debbano essere distribuiti uniformemente all’interno del loro intervallo di
esistenza cos`ı che ciascuno abbia la medesima probabilita` di essere estratto. La seconda,
invece, richiede che, senza alcun mezzo possibile, non si sia in grado di predire il numero
successivo di una sequenza generata casualmente, anche solo parzialmente.
Questa specifica proprieta`, in particolare, e` indispensabile in molti protocolli crip-
tografici poiche´ assicura un alto livello di sicurezza nella distribuzione di chiave (key
distribution) e nel processo di autenticazione. Esempi tipici sono gli schemi di condivi-
sione segreta (secret sharing schemes), usati per la memorizzazione sicura di informazioni
in supporti informatici tramite la loro criptazione e frammentazione, e nella quantum
key distribution, il piu` alto grado di sicurezza realizzato. [3] Di conseguenza, e` cruciale
sviluppare un metodo in grado di generare sequenze casuali che rispettino tali proprieta`.
I Random Number Generators (RNGs) possono essere suddivisi in due categorie:
Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs) e physical random number generators
(physical RNGs). PRNGs sono basati su algoritmi od anche su combinazioni di tali
algoritmi. [4, 5, 6, 7] Sequenze finite di numeri generati da PRNGs posso apparire ca-
suali, cos`ı da superare alcuni test statistici specificatamente realizzati per testarne le
caratteristiche. Tuttavia, queste sequenze sono create in maniera deterministica da un
seme (seed) comune e cio` comporta che i numeri generati, dopo un tempo sufficiente-
mente lungo, si ripeteranno. [8] Questo comportamento puo` causare seri problemi per
applicazioni nel campo della sicurezza o di sistemi computazionali in parallelo, si veda
per esempio [9]. Physical RNGs usano casualita` da osservabili fisiche come il rumore
fotonico, il rumore termico nei resistori, jitter di frequenza di oscillatori e, recentemente,
sistemi caotici di LASERs a semiconduttore. [10, 11, 12, 13, 14]
Tali generatori, tuttavia, non possiedono lo stesso rate di generazione dei PRNGs a
causa di limitazioni nel rate di acquisizione e nella capacita` del meccanismo. Sebbene
sfruttare processi fisici casuali per generare sequenze di numeri sembri ragionevole, sis-
temi puramente classici possiedono una natura deterministica oltre determinate scale
temporali. Processi quantistici, al contrario, permettono di sfruttare l’assoluta presenza
della casualita` e quindi dell’estrazione casuale. Queste tipologie di generatori formano
una categoria a se stante chiamata Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNGs).
La meccanica quantistica elementare mostra che la natura stessa del mondo micro-
scopico e` imprevedibile e quindi “casuale”. In particolare, sistemi quantistici sono pura-
mente descritti in termini probabilistici. Esistono diversi fenomeni quantistici utili per
la generazione di numeri casuali. I piu` comuni sono quelli relativi al decadimento di
nuclei radioattivi [15, 16] dove il processo casuale di una emissione α, β o γ permette di
generare bits, 0 or 1, in corrispondenza o meno di una misura da parte del rivelatore.
Tuttavia il sistema richiede estrema precauzione nel maneggiare e conservare sostanze
radioattive. Al contrario, sistemi ottici sono molto piu` sicuri e semplici da realizzare.
Alcuni di questi sono: beams splitting di singolo fotone, misure di polarizzazione di
singolo fotone [17] o periodi light-dark di segnali di fluorescenza relativi a risonanze di
singoli ioni intrappolati. [18, 19]
In implementazioni pratiche di QRNGs, il processo fisico non e` mai ottenuto perfetta-
mente. Sono sempre presenti influenze (noises) che non sono controllate o controllabili
dall’utente. Lo scopo di questo lavoro e` di presentare un nuovo approccio per estrarre
numeri casuali veramente casuali tramite l’impiego di specifici post-processings. Il mod-
ello teorico e matematico e` basato sul lavoro di D. Frauchiger, R. Renner and M. Troyer
“True randomness from realistic quantum devices” [20]. La tesi si focalizza sul metodo
base introdotto nel precedente lavoro e lo estende ad uno piu` generale concentrandosi
sull’analisi richiesta.
Cap. (1) presenta l’approccio matematico concentrandosi sulla natura quantistica del
processo. Cap. (2) presenta la teoria della misura ed in particolare sulle POVM. Cap. (3)
mostra la teoria della statistica di fotorivelazione necessaria per lo studio del processo
di rilevazione dei fotoni. Cap. (4) spiega i modelli teorici usati per introdurre gli ef-
fetti perturbativi presenti in ogni apparato reale. Cap. (5) mostra il setup usato per
l’esperimento. Cap. (6) descrive l’analisi eseguita per caratterizzare la telecamera di ril-
evazione usata nell’esperimento, in particolar modo la sua efficienza quantica. Cap. (7)
riporta i risultati sperimentali dell’analisi sulle influenze elettroniche. Cap. (8) presenta
il concetto di entropia necessario per “quantificare” l’informazione estraibile da una
stringa di bit. Il capitolo introduce inoltre la generalizzazione del modello quantistico e
l’implementazione dei precedenti rumori elettronici nella sua analisi. Cap. (9) mostra gli
estrattori classici e quantistici impiegati per generare numeri casuali. Cap. (10) e (11)
illustrano i test statistici usati per verificare la casualita` ed i relativi risultati sia per i
numeri generati per via classica che quantistica.

Introduction
A number generated with no apparent rule is called a random number. Random numbers
are widely used for various purposes. They play a crucial role in guaranteeing the secrecy
of a system in the field of cryptography. The performance and reliability of the digital
networked society rely on the degree of randomness that it can generate. They are used in
communication and computing such as Monte Carlo simulations, financial predictions,
biophysics and nuclear medicine testing and even more. They are also necessary for
many commercial applications such as lottery games, slot machines and wireless data
transmissions. [1, 2]
A True Random Number Generator (TRNG) is mathematically defined as a number
generator that produces a number out of a large set N with probability 1/N. To ensure
that a number is truly random, there are two fundamental properties that it must
possess: statistical uniformity and unpredictability. The first one specify that the values
of random numbers must be uniformly distributed over their range so that extracting
any of them is equally probable. The latter, instead, requires that with no means it is
possible to predict, even partially, the next value in a random sequence.
This specific property, in particular, is indispensable in many cryptographic protocols
as this ensures a high-security level of key distribution and authentication. Typical
examples are secret sharing schemes, which are used for securely storing data in storage
devices by encrypting and dividing it, and quantum key distribution, which is expected
to achieve the ultimate security. [3] Therefore, it is crucial to develop a method of
generating random sequences with these properties.
Random Number Generators (RNGs) may be classified into two categories: Pseudo-
Random Number Generators (PRNGs) and physical random number generators (phys-
ical RNGs). PRNGs are based on algorithms or even a combinations of algorithms.
[4, 5, 6, 7] Finite sequences of numbers generated by PRNGs may appear random so to
pass some random tests specially made to verify randomness. However, these sequences
are created deterministically from a common seed and thus permitting to obtain the
same numbers after a sufficiently long time [8]. This behavior may cause serious prob-
lems for applications in security or parallel computation systems, see for example [9].
Physical RNGs use randomness from a physical observable such as photon noise, thermal
noise in resistors, frequency jitter of oscillators and, more recently, chaotic semiconductor
LASERs. [10, 11, 12, 13, 14]
These kind of generators, however, do not possess the same generation rate of the
PRNGs due to limitations of the acquisition rate and power of the mechanisms. Al-
though relying on physical random processes to generate sequences of numbers may
sound reasonable, purely classical systems have a deterministic nature over relevant
time scales. In contrast, quantum processes permit to exploit the absolute power of
randomness and then randomness extraction. These typologies of generators form a
category by themselves called Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNGs).
Elementary quantum mechanics explains that the very nature of the microscopic world
is unpredictable and thus “random”. In particular, quantum systems are described using
probabilistic notions. There exist many different quantum phenomenons suitable to
generate random numbers. The most common is the decay of radioactive nuclei [15, 16]
where the random process of α, β or γ emission permits to generate bits, 0 or 1, if
the detector registers an event or not. However, this system requires extra precautions
in handling and storing radioactive substances. On the contrary, optical systems are
much safer and simpler to realize. Some of these are: single photon beams splitting,
single photons polarization measurements [17] or light-dark periods of single trapped
ions’ resonance fluorescence signal. [18, 19]
In practical implementations of QRNGs, the physical process is never achieved per-
fectly. There are always influences (noises) that are not fully controlled or controllable by
the user. This work’s aim is to present a new approach to extract truly random numbers
through the usage of specific post-processing. The mathematical and theoretical layout
is based on the work of D. Frauchiger, R. Renner and M. Troyer “True randomness from
realistic quantum devices” [20]. The thesis focuses on the basic method introduced in
this work and then extend it to a more general one concentrating on the required analysis.
Chap. (1) presents the mathematical approach concentrating on the quantum nature
of the process. Chap. (2) presents the measurement theory focusing on the POVM.
Chap. (3) shows the photocount statistic theory necessary to study the process of pho-
ton detection. Chap. (4) explains the theoretical models used to account for the noises
effects present in every realistic device. Chap. (5) displays the setup used for the ex-
periment. Chap. (6) describes the analysis made to characterize the photon detection
device used for the research focusing on its quantum efficiency. Chap. (7) reports the
experimental results from the analysis of device’s electronic noises. Chap. (8) presents
the concept of entropy necessary to “quantify” the information carried by a string bit.
It also introduces the generalization of the quantum model and the implementation of
the previously introduced electronic noises. Chap. (9) shows both classical and quantum
extractors used to generate random strings of bits. Chaps. (10) and (11) explain the
statistical tests used to verify randomness and the tests results for both the classical and
quantum generated bit strings.
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1 QRNG model
Secure random numbers generation is not just of academic interest, e.g. data analysis,
numerical simulations. It is also very relevant for practice, e.g. gambling, lottery ex-
tractions, in particular for cryptographic systems where is essential to guarantee their
security during key generation and distribution between parties. Both theoretical and
practical approaches have been made to quantify randomness. All of them however
analyze the number extracted by itself instead of the process that produced it. The
current chapter presents the theoretical model designed by D. Frauchiger, R. Renner
and M. Troyer [20]. The model explains how to extract truly random numbers using a
post-processing algorithm of the raw randomness generated by an imperfect device, i.e.
presence of noise or any kind of external influences that cannot be managed.
1.1 True randomness
The usage of spacetime variables notion is essential to introduce a formal and quanti-
tative definition of pure randomness. These are random variables with an associated
coordinate that indicates the physical location of the value in relativistic spacetime [21].
The output, X, of a random process as well as all side information, i.e. spacetime
variables which model any additional information that may be correlated to X. The
spacetime coordinates of X should be interpreted as the event where the process starts,
generating X. For side information, the coordinates of the corresponding spacetime vari-
ables indicate when and where this information is accessible. From these assumptions,
it is possible to define a truly random variable.
Definition 1. X is called -truly random if it’s -close to uniform and uncorrelated to
all other space time variables which are not in the future light cone of X. Denoting this
set by ΓX, the mathematical formulation is defined as follows:
1
2
||PX ΓX − PX¯XPΓX ||1 ≤  (1.1)
where
PX¯(x) =
1
|Ω| ∀x (1.2)
and
1
2
||PX −QX ||1 = 1
2
∑
x
|PX(x)−QX(x)| (1.3)
is the trace distance.
1
CHAPTER 1. QRNG MODEL
The trace distance has the following interpretation: if two probability distributions
are -close in trace distance, then one may consider the two systems as identical except
with probability at most .
1.2 Leftover Hash Lemma
Considering a random variable X that is partially known to an adversary, i.e. the enemy
possesses side information E correlated to X, one may ask whether it is possible to extract
from X a part Z that is entirely unknown to adversary, i.e. uniform conditioned on E.
If the answer is affirmative, what is the maximum size of Z and how it is computed?
The answer to all these question lies in the Leftover Hash Lemma. More precisely, the
output of a function f selected randomly from a chosen family of functions F , called
two-universal family of hash functions, provides Z. In most researches, the universal
hashing method is based on probability theory and side information of a purely and
entirely classical. By these means the (classical) Lemma states the following:
Lemma 1 (Classical Leftover Hash Lemma). Let X and E be random variables and let
F be a two-universal family of hash functions with domain Ω and range {0, 1}t. Then,
on average over the choices of f from F , the distribution of the output Z ≡ f(X) is
Delta-close from uniform conditioned on E, where:
∆ =
1
2
√
2 t−Hmin(X|E)
The Lemma immediately implies that for a fixed joint distribution of X and E, there
is a fixed function f that extracts almost uniform randomness. More precisely, given any
∆ > 0, there exists a function f that produces
t =
[
Hmin(X|E)− 2 log2
1
2∆
]
bit that are ∆-close to uniform and independent of E.
A majority of original works on universal hashing are based entirely on probability
theory and side information. These papers are (often implicitly) assumed to be repre-
sented by a classical system E (modeled as a random variable). The reasons for this
kind of formulation lies in the following reasoning. The process of hashing is purely and
entirely classic, since values of a random variable X are mapped to those of a random
variable Z by a function. It is then reasonable to assume that it is irrelevant to con-
sider the physical nature of the side information and justify a classical treatment. This
assumption is, however, not necessarily the case. Some recent works [22, 23], showed
that the output of certain extractor functions may be partially known if side information
about their input is stored in a quantum device of a certain size, while the same output
is almost uniform conditioned on any side information stored in a classical system of
the same size. Knowing this, it is necessary to generalize Lemma 1 so to reflect the
2
1.2. LEFTOVER HASH LEMMA
quantum nature of a system E [24, 25, 26]. Considering the quantum nature of E, there
is a need to consider the more general case of non-classical side information, i.e. X may
be quantum correlated to E. Let ρxE be the state of E when X = x on the product space
HX⊗HE. This situation can be characterized conveniently by a classical-quantum state
(CQ-state) in the following compact form:
ρXE =
∑
x∈Ω
PX(x) |x〉 〈x| ⊗ ρxE (1.4)
where the classical value x ∈ Ω may be viewed as encoded in mutually orthogonal
states { |x〉x∈Ω} on a quantum system X. To quantify the quality of randomness it’s
mainly used the concept of min-Entropy, Hmin(X) (see Chap. (8)), where, to account
for the correlation with the system E, may be reformulated as follows:
Hmin(X|E) = sup
[
λ : 2−λ 1X ⊗ σE − ρXE ≥ 0 ;σE ≥ 0
]
(1.5)
This corresponds to the maximum probability of guessing X given E, and therefore
naturally generalizes the classical conditioned min-Entropy (see Chap. (8)) [27]. In the
same way, the independence condition of Eq. (1.1) naturally becomes:
1
2
|| ρXE − ρX¯ ⊗ ρE ||1 ≤ 
where || · ||1 = Tr(| · |) denotes the trace norm and ρX¯ = 1|Ω|1X the fully mixed
density operator on X. The previous condition characterizes the states for which X is
(almost) uniformly distributed and independent of E. An important property of this
condition is that the trace norm can only decrease if it is applied a physical mapping,
e.g. a measurement, on the system E. Leftover hashing is a special case of randomness
extraction where the hash function is chosen from a particular class of functions, called
two-universal [28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34]. They are defined as families F of functions
from Ω to {0, 1}t such that:
Pr
(
f(x) = f(x
′
)
)
≤ 1
2t
for ∀x, x′ ∈ Ω |x 6= x′ and f chosen uniformly at random from F .
Now having all the information required, it is possible to state the Leftover Hash Lemma
with Side Information:
Lemma 2 (Quantum Leftover Hash Lemma). Let ρXE be a CQ-state and let F be a
two-universal family of hash functions from Ω to {0, 1}t. Then
1
2
|| ρF (X)EF − ρZ¯ ⊗ ρEF ||1 ≤ 2−
1
2
(Hmin(X|E)−t) ≡ hash (1.6)
where
ρF (X)EF =
∑
f∈F
1
|F|ρf(x)E ⊗ |f〉 〈f | (1.7)
and where ρZ¯ is the fully mixed density operator on the space encoding {0, 1}t
3
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The Lemma tells that, whenever t < Hmin(X|E), the output f(x) of the hash func-
tion is uniform and independent of E, except with probability hash < 1. The entropy
Hmin(X|E) thus corresponds to the amount of randomness that can be extracted from
X requiring uniformity and independence from E. Furthermore, the deviation hash de-
creases exponentially as Hmin(X|E) increases. It is important to note the inclusion of
f in the state, ρF (X)EF , as this ensures that f(x) is random even if the function f is
known. For a device that generates a continuous sequence of output bits, the hash func-
tion is usually applied block-wise and the outcomes are concatenated. In this case, it is
sufficient to choose the hash function once, using randomness that is independent of the
device. For practice, this means that the hash function may be selected already when
manufacturing the device (using independent randomness) and hardcoded on the device.
For example, it can be chosen a random matrix (t × n), kij, through which define the
two-universal hashing function Y = f(x) as the matrix product modulo 2:
Yi =
n∑
j=1
mod2 (kijXj) (1.8)
this way the string generated, Yi with i = 1, 2, . . . t, satisfies the conditions of
Lemma 2.
1.3 Side information of an ideal QRNG
On an abstract level, a QRNG may be modeled as a process where a quantum system
is prepared in a fixed state and then measured. Under the assumption that (i) the state
of the system is pure and that (ii) the measurement on the system is projective, the
outcomes are truly random, i.e. independent of anything preexisting [21]. However,
for realistic implementations, neither of the two assumptions is usually satisfied. If the
preparation is noisy then the system is generally, prior to the measurement, in a mixed
state. Furthermore, an imperfect implementation of a projective measurement, e.g.
with inefficient detectors, is no longer projective, but rather acts as a general Positive-
Operator Measure, POVM (see Chap. (2)), on the system [35]. These deviations from
assumptions (i) and (ii) mean that there exists side information that may be correlated
to the outcomes of the measurement. The aim of the research is to quantify the amount
of independent randomness that is still present in the measurements results. More
precisely, find a lower bound on the conditional min-Entropy of the measurement results
given the side information.
Definition 2. A QRNG is defined by a density operator ρS on a system S together with
a projective measurement {ΠxS}x∈Ω on S. The raw randomness is the random variable X
obtained by applying this measurement to a system prepared according to ρS.
This way, the probability distribution PX of X is therefore given by the Born rule:
PX(x) = Tr (Π
x
SρS) (1.9)
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The following framework is based on a QRNG modeled on a PBS (Polarising Beam
Splitter). A PBS is a birefringent material which reflects vertically polarized photons
and transmits horizontally polarized photons as shown in Fig. (8.4) in Chap. (8). To
generate randomness, a diagonally polarized light pulse illuminate the PBS. After passing
through the PBS, the light hits one of the two detectors, labeled R1 and R2, depending on
whether it was reflected (1) or transmitted (2). The output of the device is X = (X1, X2)
where X1,2 are bits indicating whether the corresponding detector R1,2 clicked. In the
ideal case, where the light pulses contain exactly one photon and where the detectors are
maximally efficient, only the outcomes X = (0, 1) and X = (1, 0) are possible. According
to quantum theory, the resulting bit, indicating whether X = (0, 1) or X = (1, 0), is
uniformly distributed and unpredictable, that is truly random. The situation changes
if the ideal detectors are replaced by imperfects ones, which sometimes fail to notice an
incoming photon, and if the light source sometimes emits pulses with more than one
photon. It is still possible to obtain the previous outcomes but now these can no longer
be interpreted as the result of a polarization measurement. Rather, it is determined
by the detectors’ probabilistic behavior, i.e. whether they are sensitive at the moment
when the light pulses arrived. In other words, the device outputs detector noise instead
of quantum randomness originating from the PBS. Prior to the realistic model, it is
worth dwelling on the theoretical one.
Definition 3 (Ideal PBS-based QRNG). Consider a QRNG based on a PBS, as previ-
ously described. The source as well as the PBS may be regarded as part of the state
preparation, so that ρS corresponds to the joint state of the two light modes traveling
to the detectors, R1,2 respectively. In the ideal case, where the source emits one single
diagonally polarized photon, ρS = |φ〉 〈φ|R1,R2 is the pure state defined by
|φ〉R1,R2 =
1√
2
(|0〉R1 ⊗ |1〉R2 + |1〉R1 ⊗ |0〉R2)
where it has been used the number bases for R1 and R2.
Provided the detectors are perfect, their action is defined forR = R1,2 by the projectors
Π0R = |0〉 〈0|R and Π1R = |1〉 〈1|R. Since each of the two modes (R1 and R2) is measured
separately, the overall measurement is given by:{
Π0R1 ⊗ Π0R2 , Π0R1 ⊗ Π1R2 , Π1R1 ⊗ Π0R2 , Π1R1 ⊗ Π1R2
}
From Eq. (1.9), the raw randomness X = (X1, X2) is equivalent to a uniformly dis-
tributed bit:
PX(0, 1) = PX(1, 0) =
1
2
For the realistic model some of the stringent assumptions made on the system are to
be discarded.
5
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Figure 1.1: Side Information. For a QRNG, defined by a projective measurement on
a system S with outcome X, all side information can be obtained from a
purifying system E, i.e. an extra system that is chosen such that the joint
state on S and E is pure.
Definition 4 (Realistic PBS-based QRNG). A realistic device detects an incoming
photon only with bounded probability η. On the subspace of the optical mode, R = R1
or R = R2, spanned by |0〉R (no photon) and |1〉R (1 photon), its action is given by the
POVM, {V 0R , V 1R} with:
V 1R = η |1〉 〈1|R and V 2R = 1R − V 1R
To describe this as a projective measurement, it is needed to consider an extended
space (Neumark’s theorem) with an additional subsystem, R
′
, that determines whether
the detector is sensitive or not (|1〉R′ and |0〉R′ respectively). Specifically, it may be
possible to define the extended projective measurement
{
Π0
RR′ , Π
1
RR′
}
by:
Π1
RR′ = |1〉 〈1|R ⊗ |1〉 〈1|R′ and Π0RR′ = 1RR′ − Π1RR′
It is then easily verified that the action of {V 0R , V 1R} on any state τR is reproduced by
the action of
{
Π0
RR′ , Π
1
RR′
}
on the product τR ⊗ τR′ where:
τR′ = (1− η) |0〉 〈0|R′ + η |1〉 〈1|R′ (1.10)
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To asses the quality of a QRNG, it is also needed a description of its side information.
To do so, it can be used a purification |ψ〉SE of the state ρS with purifying system E
(see Fig. (1.1)). Any possible side information may now be described as the outcome of
a measurement on E.
Example 1 (Side Information for an inefficient detector). Consider an inefficient detec-
tor, R = R1 or R = R2 as in Description 4. A classical bit T may determine whether
the detector is sensitive to incoming photons or not (T = 1 and T = 0 respectively). T
could then be considered as side information W. This information can indeed be easily
obtained from a measurement on a purification of the state τR′ (see Eq. (1.10)). For
example, for the purification
|φ〉R′E =
√
1− η |0〉R′ ⊗ |0〉E +
√
η |1〉R′ ⊗ |1〉E
the value T is retrieved as the outcome of the projective measurement {|0〉 〈0|E , |1〉 〈1|E}
applied to E.
Based on what has been said, now it is possible to summarize the requirements for the
extraction of random numbers combined with the fact that quantum theory is complete:1
Definition 5. Consider a QRNG that generats raw randomness X and let E be a
purifying system of S. Furthermore, let f be a function chosen uniformly at random
and independently of all other values from a two-universal family of hash functions with
output length
t ≤ Hmin(X|E)− 2 log2
(
1

)
Then the result Z = f(X) is -truly random.
Proof. According to the definition of -true randomness it is needed to ensure that
1
2
||PF (X)WF − PZ¯ × PWF ||1 ≤  (1.11)
where W is any value available outside the future light cone of the event where the
measurement X started, F is the random variable indicating the uniform choice of the
has function from the two-universal family, and PZ¯ is the uniform distribution on {0, 1}t.
It follows from the completeness of quantum theory [21] that such a W can always be
obtained by a measurement of all available quantum systems, in this case E. But because
the trace distance can only decrease under physical mappings, Eq. (1.11) holds whenever
1
2
|| ρF (X)EF − ρZ¯ ⊗ ρEF ||1 ≤ 
The claim then follows by the Leftover Hash Lemma (see Sec. (1.2)).
1The specific demonstration is based on what has been previously exposed.
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Note that Definition 5 does not require a description of classical side information,
i.e. there is no need to model the side information explicitly. This is important for
practice, as it could be hard to find an explicit and complete model for all classical side
information present in a realistic device.
1.4 Maximum classical noise model
For a realistic QRNG, it is (essentially) never attained an ideal quantum process. The
fact is that there are always various type of noise generators, both externally and in-
ternally to the system, which can not be fully controlled. In this category fall the side
information too. All these influences are generally referred to as “noise” and using Defi-
nition 5 it is possible to quantify the true randomness of such “noisy” QRNG. However,
the criterion involve the conditional min-Entropy for quantum systems, which may be
hard to evaluate for practical devices. Fortunately it exists a way to find a classical
value C which is as good as the side information E in the sense that:
Hmin(X|C) ≤ Hmin(X|E) (1.12)
holds.
The previously statement is referred to as the Maximum classical noise model. The ran-
dom variable C may be obtained by a measurement on the system S, but this measure-
ment must not interfere with the measurement carried out by the QRNG (see Fig. (1.2)).
Furthermore, Eq. (1.12) can only holds if the measurement of C is maximally informa-
tive. This means that the post-measurement state should be pure conditioned on C.
Definition 6. A maximum classical noise model for a QRNG with state ρS and pro-
jective measurement {ΠxS}x on S is a generalized measurement {EcS}c∈C on S such that
the following requirements are satisfied:
(i) the map
PX←S : τS 7→
∑
x
Tr (ΠxSτS) |x〉 〈x|
is invariant under composition with the map
OS←S : τS 7→
∑
c
EcSτS(E
c
S)
†
i.e. PX←S ◦ OS←S = PX←S
(ii) the state
ρS|C=c =
(EcS)
† ρSEcS
Tr
[(
EcS
)†
ρSEcS
]
obtained by conditioning on the outcome C = c of the measurement {EcS}c is pure
∀ c ∈ C.
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Figure 1.2: Classical noise model. The maximum classical noise C of a QRNG is defined
by a measurement on S that does not affect the projective measurement
carried out by the QRNG, but gives maximal information about the raw
randomness X.
The outcome C of the measurement {EcS}c applied to ρS is called Maximum classical
noise.
Example 2 (Maximum classical noise model for an inefficient detector). Consider a
system as described in Definition 4 and its description in terms of a projective measure-
ment
{
Π0
RR′ , Π
1
RR′
}
on an extended system. If the state ρR of the optical mode is pure
then the measurement
{
E0
RR′ , E
1
RR′
}
defined by
E0
RR′ = 1R ⊗ |0〉 〈0|R′ and E1RR′ = 1R ⊗ |1〉 〈1|R′ (1.13)
is a maximum classical noise model. To see this, note that the first criterion of
Definition 6 is satisfied because this measurement commutes with the measurement{
Π0
RR′ , Π
1
RR′
}
of the detector. Furthermore, because
{
E0
RR′ , E
1
RR′
}
restricted to R
′
is
a rank-one measurement, the post-measurement state is pure, so that the second criterion
of Definition 6 is also satisfied. Note that the maximum classical noise, C,defined as the
outcome of the measurement
{
E0
RR′ , E
1
RR′
}
, is a bit that indicates whether the detector
is sensitive or not, as in Example 1. For the PBS-based QRNG with two detectors, R1
and R2, the classical noise would be C = (T1, T2), where T1 and T2 are the corresponding
indicator bits for each detector.
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The statement of Eq. (1.12) is then verified using the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. Consider a QRNG that generates raw randomness X and let E be a purifying
system. Then, for any maximum classical noise C
Hmin(X|C) ≤ Hmin(X|E) (1.14)
Proof. The first requirement od Definition 6 guarantees that the random variables C
and X are defined simultaneously. Because, by the second requirement of Definition 6,
the state S conditioned on C is pure, it is necessarily indipendent of E. Since X is
obtained by a measurement on S, it is also independent of E, conditioned on C. Hence
it is obtained the Markov chain
X ↔ C ↔ E
which implies
Hmin(X|C) = Hmin(X|CE)
The assertion then follows from the data processing inequality for the min-Entropy2
Hmin(X|CE) ≤ Hmin(X|E)
From the joint probability distribution determined by the Born rule
PXC(x, c) = Tr
(
ΠxSE
c
SρS (E
c
S)
†
)
(1.15)
the conditional min-Entropy, Hmin(X|C), can be calculated using Eq. (8.3).
1.5 Quantum randomness
When analyzing realistic QRNGs, purely classical random variables conveniently de-
scribe them. As shown, a maximum classical noise model and, hence, a random variable
C (see Definition 6) captures all side information. Similarly, it can be introduced a
random variable, Q, that accounts for the “quantum randomness”, i.e. the part of the
randomness that is intrinsically unpredictable. The idea is to define this as the random-
ness that “remains” after accounting for the maximum classical noise C.
Definition 7. Consider a QRNG that generates raw randomness X and let C be max-
imum classical noise, jointly distributed according to PXC . Let PQ be a probability
distribution and let Ω : (q, c) 7→ x be a function such that
PXC = PΩ(Q,C)C
2The min-Entropy satisfies the data processing inequality: discarding side information of a system can
only increase the entropy, i.e. for any two systems E and E
′
, Hmin(X|EE′) ≤ Hmin(X|E).
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where
PΩ(Q,C)C(x, c) =
∑
q : Ω(q,c)=x
PQ(q)PC(c)
The corresponding random variable Q is called quantum randomness.
Example 3 (Quantum randomness of a PBS-based QRNG). The quantum randomness
of the PBS-based QRNG of Definition 3 may be defined as the path that the photon
takes after the PBS (i.e. whether it travels to R1 or R2). For a single diagonally
polarized photon, Q would therefore be a uniformly distributed bit. Then, for inefficient
detectors with maximum classical noise T1 and T2 defined as in Example 2, the function
χ : (q, t1, t2) 7→ x = (x1, x2) is given by
χ(q, t1, t2) =
{
(t1, 0) if q = 1
(0, t2) if q = 2
11

2 POVM
A measurement of a system is one of the most important and fundamental key to quan-
tum theory. There exist many different interpretations of a quantum measurement, most
of them rely on the von Neumann’s projective postulate based on the “collapsed wave
function” model. This chapter presents the general definition of quantum measurement
dwelling on the POVM (Positive-Operator Valued Measure).
2.1 POVM measurement
The state of a quantum system, |ψ〉, is a vector in a complex vector space (Hilbert space)
H. If the set of vectors |n〉 with n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 is an orthonormal basis for this
space, then |ψ〉 may be expressed as:
|ψ〉 =
N−1∑
n=0
cn |n〉 (2.1)
for some complex coefficients cn where
∑
n |cn|2 = 1. The quantum measurement of a
system evolves from the “von Neumann’s projective postulate”:1 [36]
Postulate. If an ideal measurement (that minimally perturbs the system) of II kind
(that if the measurement is performed, the same value is retrieved immediately after)of
an observable O on the state |ψ〉 gives an outcome in a set ∆, immediately after the
state of the system is projected on the subset of the spectrum of O contained in ∆.
The elements |ψ〉 are called “pure state” and provide a maximal knowledge of a system.
Sometimes it is not known with certainty which of the pure state the systems is, but only
that it is in one of them, (|φ1〉 , |φ2〉 , · · · , |φm〉) with probability (p1, p2, . . . , pm). Natu-
rally these probabilities satisfy the common relation,
∑
m pm = 1. In these particular
cases, it is used the more compact form, ρ, called density matrix:
ρ ≡
∑
i
pi |φi〉 〈φi| (2.2)
The previous expression is obtained from the definition of the mean of a quantum
observable.
1It is necessary to specify that the measurements that fall in this definition belong to a more wide and
generic field called PVM (Projection Valued Measurements)
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Let O be an operator of a quantum observable, the mean of O on the pure state |ψ〉
is:
〈O〉ψ = 〈ψ|O|ψ〉 (2.3)
For a system Σ that describes a density matrix ρ, Eq. (2.3) becomes:
〈O〉Σ =
m∑
i=1
pi 〈φi|O|φi〉 (2.4)
If |φ〉 ∈ H:
〈φ|O|φ〉 = Tr (|φ〉 〈φ|O) (2.5)
To prove Eq. (2.5) let { |χj〉 : j = 1, . . . ,∞} be a base for H with |χ1〉 = |φ〉. The r.h.
side of Eq. (2.5) becomes:
Tr(|φ〉 〈φ|O) ≡
∞∑
j=1
〈χj | (|φ〉 〈φ|O) |χj〉
=
∞∑
j=1
〈χj |χ1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
δj1
〈χ1|O|χj〉
= 〈χ1|χ1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
〈χ1|O|χ1〉
= 〈φ|O|φ〉 (2.6)
From the relation expressed in Eq. (2.6), Eq. (2.4) becomes:
〈O〉Σ =
m∑
i=1
piTr (|φi〉 〈φi|O)
= Tr
[
m∑
i=1
pi |φi〉 〈φi|O
]
= Tr (ρO) (2.7)
From the previous statement it can be shown that the density matrix satisfies the
following properties:
(i) ρ = ρ†
(ii) ρ ≥ 0
(iii) Tr (ρ)=1
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The mathematical action of Hermitian matrices A on the orthonormal vectors |i〉
represents the physical action of quantum measurement:
A =
n∑
k=1
akPk with Pk = |ak〉 〈ak| (2.8)
where Pk is called projective operator, or more generally projector, that can be re-
garded as the answer to question “What is the probability of finding the state |ψ〉 in the
state |k〉”. [36]
These operators satisfy the following properties:
(i) Hermitiannes: Pi = P†i
(ii) Positiveness: 〈n|Pi|n〉 ≥ 0 per ∀ |n〉
(iii) Completeness:
n∑
i=1
Pi = 1n
(iv) Orthogonality and projectivity: PiPj = δijPi
This way, after making the measurement, the system will be found in the ρm state
with probability pm:
2
pm = 〈m|ρ|m〉 = Tr(Pm ρPm) = Tr(P 2m ρ) = Tr(Pm ρ) (2.9)
ρm = |m〉 〈m| = Pm ρPm
Tr(Pm ρPm)
=
Pm ρPm
pm
(2.10)
All these conditions hold only for an ideal system, where the observed object couples
with the measurement device and collapse onto the experimental observed state. For
a more realistic system, it is necessary to express the state through the matrix density
because a non-ideal measurement provide statistical mixture used to account the non-
maximal knowledge of the system itself. [37] This fact results in the definition of new
projective operators A˜ (although they no longer meet the condition of projectivity)
defined as following:
A˜ =
n∑
k=1
a˜kP˜k with P˜k =
∑
k
pj|kPj (2.11)
where pj|k stands for the conditioned probability of outcome j given k.
As the set {P1,P2, . . . ,Pn} provides a complete description of an ideal measurement,
the set {P˜1, P˜2, . . . , P˜n} provides a description of a realistic measurement.
2For the probability computation it has been used the cyclic property of trace: Tr[ABC] = Tr[BCA] =
Tr[CAB].
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The new operators, however, satisfy only some of the properties of the P stated pre-
viously:
(i) Hermitiannes: P˜i = P˜†i
(ii) Positiveness: 〈n| P˜ |n〉 ≥ 0 for ∀ |n〉
(iii) Completeness:
∑
i
P˜i = 1
(iv) Generally no orthogonality and no projectivity: P˜iP˜j 6= δijP˜i
As it can be seen from (iv), the new matrices are no longer projective and orthogonal
ensuring that there are an infinite number of possible choices of operators P˜ through
which define A˜. The matrices {P1,P2, . . . ,Pn} are so called POVM (Positive-Operator
Valued Measures) and the generalized measurement “POVM measurement”. Perform-
ing a measurement on the system through a POVM it is obtained the state ρ˜m with
probability p˜m:
ρ˜m =
1
p˜m
P˜†k ρ P˜k with p˜m = Tr
[
P˜†k ρ P˜k
]
(2.12)
These definitions however do not account that the matrices P˜ are no longer projective
and that the probabilities p˜m do not sum to one:
∑
k
Tr
[
P˜†k ρ P˜k
]
=
∑
k
Tr
[
P˜2k ρ
]
6= Tr
[∑
k
P˜k ρ
]
= Tr(ρ) = 1
The simplest method to change that is to define some “measurement operators” Mk
that linearly act on the system’s space through which redefine P˜:
P˜k = MkM†k (2.13)
This way Eq. (2.12) becomes:
ρ˜m =
1
pm
M†k ρMk with pm = Tr
[
M†k ρMk
]
(2.14)
where:
∑
k
Tr
[
M†k ρMk
]
=
∑
k
Tr
[
MkM†k ρ
]
= Tr
[∑
k
P˜k ρ
]
= Tr(ρ) = 1
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It is remarkable to notice that a POVM measurement repeated on the system does
not reproduce the same result, unlike a PVM measurement:
Tr
(
M†j ρkMj
)
=
Tr
(
M†jM
†
k ρMkMj
)
Tr
(
M†k ρMk
) 6= δkj (2.15)
because generally MkMj 6= δk,jMk.
The relation between PVM and POVM thus becomes evident: it is possible to trace
back to the theory of PVM as a special case of the POVM theory. Of course there
are many contexts in which the PVM measurements generate spontaneously POVM
measurements in spaces of reduced size. Also thanks to the Neumrak’s theorem it can
be shown that POVM measurements can be realized as PVM measurements in a space
of greater dimension. [37]
17

3 Photocount statistic
The task of quantum optics is to study the particle nature of a beam of light through
the usage of the “photons” concept. The basic definition of photon is that of energy
quantization of a classical electromagnetic wave with which define a beam of light. This
chapter, based on “Quantum Optics - An introduction” by Mark Fox [38], presents a
semi-classical, and quantum, approach to study the statistical properties of a photons’
flux. The quantum section will also show the rudimentary concepts of the quantization of
the electromagnetic field and the notations used to analyze photonic systems employing
“The Quantum Theory of Light” by Rodney Loudon [39].
3.1 Semi-classical theory of photodetection
Let’s consider a PCD (Photon-Counting Detector) such as a photomultiplier illuminated
by a light beam. The light interacts with the photocathode’s atoms liberating individual
electrons by the photoelectric effect. These single photoelectrons then trigger a sequence
of secondary avalanches generating a current pulse sufficiently intense to be detected with
an electronic counter. The statistical nature of the timing between the output pulses can
then be explained by making the following three assumptions about the photodetection
process:
1. The probability of the emission of a photoelectron in a short time interval ∆t is
proportional to the intensity I, the area A illuminated and the time interval ∆t
2. If ∆t is sufficiently small, the probability of emitting two photoelectrons is negli-
gibly small
3. Photoemission events registered in different time intervals are statistically inde-
pendent of each other
The probability of observing one photoemission event in the time interval [t, t + ∆t],
from assumption (1), is:
P (1, t, t+ ∆t) = ξI(t)∆t (3.1)
where ξ is proportional to the area illuminated and is equal to emission probability per
unit time and intensity while I(t) is the incident radiation intensity.
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Assuming that the probability of emitting two photoelectrons in the same time interval
is negligibly small (assumption (2)), is the same as stating the following expression:
P (0, t, t+ ∆t) = 1− P (1, t, t+ ∆t) = 1− ξI(t)∆t (3.2)
Asking that the events are to be statistically independent of each other (assumption
(3)) means that the probability of detecting n events in the time interval [0, t + ∆t] is
the same as saying:
P (n, 0, t+ ∆t) = P (n, 0, t)P (0, t, t+ ∆t) + P (n− 1, 0, t)P (1, t, t+ ∆t) (3.3)
where P (n, 0, t) and P (n − 1, 0, t) correspond to the probabilities of having n and
n-1 events in the time interval [0, t] respectively. Changing the previous notation as,
P (n, 0, t) = Pn(t), Eq. (3.3) may be rewritten in the more compact form:
Pn(t+ ∆t− Pn(t))
∆t
= ξI(t) [Pn−1(t)− Pn(t)] (3.4)
where in the limit ∆t→ 0 becomes:
dPn(t)
dt
= ξI(t) [Pn−1(t)− Pn(t)] (3.5)
Supposing that the light intensity is constant, (ξI(t) = const. = C), that is, assume
the radiation perfectly coherent, Eq. (3.5) becomes:
dPn(t)
dt
+ CPn(t) = CPn−1(t) (3.6)
with the following condition P0(0) = 1.
The equation’s solution con be subdivide into two terms: n = 0 and n > 1. When n = 0
necessarily Pn−1(t) = 0 because registering a negative number of events has no meaning.
The solution then is:
P0(t) = exp (−Ct) (3.7)
with the same boundary condition P0(0)=1.
For the n > 1 case, Eq. (3.6) is then multiply by the integrating factor exp(Ct) to obtain:
d
dt
(
eCtPn(t)
)
= CeCtPn−1(t) (3.8)
which, on integrating, gives:
Pn(t) = e
−Ct
∫ t
0
CeCt
′
Pn−1(t
′
)dt
′
(3.9)
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To solve Eq. (3.9), it is used a recursively method employing P0(t) given by Eq. (3.7):
P1(t) = e
−Ct
∫ t
0
CeCt
′
P0(t
′
)dt
′
= (Ct) e−Ct
P2(t) = e
−Ct
∫ t
0
CeCt
′
P1(t
′
)dt
′
=
(Ct)2
2
e−Ct
P3(t) = e
−Ct
∫ t
0
CeCt
′
P2(t
′
)dt
′
=
(Ct)3
3!
e−Ct
...
Pn(t) = e
−Ct
∫ t
0
CeCt
′
Pn−1(t
′
)dt
′
=
(Ct)n
n!
e−Ct (3.10)
When the intensity is not constant, the term Ct has to be replaced by
∫ t
0
ξI(t
′
)dt
′
. It
is possible to cast Eq. (3.10) into a simpler form noticing that the event probability per
unit time is equal to ξI(t), thus, if the intensity is constant, the mean count rate n in
the time interval [0, t] is just given by:
n = ξIt = Ct (3.11)
Hence Eq. (3.10) assumes the following form:
Pn(t) =
nn
n!
e−n (3.12)
which shows that, for a constant I(t), it is obtained a Poissonian distribution. Eq. (3.12)
demonstrates that it is possible to explain the photocount statistic through the Poisso-
nian distribution without invoking concepts like photons or quantum field radiation. [38]
The fundamental demand is that the emission of photoelectrons has to be a probabilistic
process triggered by the absorption of a quantum of energy from the light beam. At the
same time, it is clear that this approach does not show a photon statistic of any kind.
Only with a quantum approach it is possible to relate the two concepts.
3.2 Quantum theory of photodetection
3.2.1 Quantization of the electromagnetic field
The electromagnetic field is associated to a quantum system of a three-dimensional
harmonic oscillators. It is possible to simplify the notation narrowing the notation to
a one-dimension system. This way, the quantum-mechanical Hamiltonian for a one-
dimensional harmonic oscillator, with frequency ω, is:
Hˆ =
pˆ 2
2m
+
1
2
mω2qˆ 2 (3.13)
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where the position and momentum operators, qˆ and pˆ respectively, satisfy the com-
mutation relation:
[qˆ, pˆ] = i~
Replacing the operators qˆ and pˆ with two dimensionless operators, aˆ and aˆ†, Eq. (3.13)
becomes:
Hˆ = ~ω
(
aˆ†aˆ+
1
2
)
(3.14)
where aˆ and aˆ† corresponds to the destruction and creation operators respectively, for
the harmonic oscillator. They satisfy the following commutation relation:[
aˆ, aˆ†
]
= 1 (3.15)
Let |n〉 be an energy eigenstate with eigenvalue En of the Hamiltonian operator. The
eigenvalue equation is:
Hˆ |n〉 = ~ω
(
aˆ†aˆ+
1
2
)
|n〉 = En |n〉 (3.16)
En =
(
n+
1
2
)
~ω n = 0, 1, 2 ...
where n is the eigenvalue of the “particle number” operator nˆ = aˆ†aˆ. This way, |n〉 is
also called “number state”:
nˆ |n〉 = n |n〉
Given the previous notation, suppose that the radiation is confined inside a cubic
cavity of edge L. The vector-potential, Aˆkλ, may be expressed as a linear combination
of permitted oscillating modes that satisfy the periodic boundary condition (bold font
indicate a three-dimensional variable):
Aˆkλ =
∑
k
∑
λ=1,2
ekλAˆkλ(r, t) (3.17)
ki = 2pi
ni,l
L
i = x, y, z ed nl = 0, ±1, ±2, ±3 · · ·
where ekλ is the spatial unit vector, k is the wavevector representing the radiation
while λ is a polarization index that specify if the radiation is vertically (1) or horizon-
tally (2) polarized. It is fundamental to stress out that Eq. (3.17) does not refer to
classical function but to a quantum field operator. It is common to express Aˆkλ with
the destruction and creation operators as to simplify the notation.
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Naturally, both operators now have to follow a more general commutation relation:[
aˆkλ, aˆ
†
k
′
λ′
]
= δ
k,k
′ δλ,λ′
Eq. (3.17) thus becomes:
Aˆkλ =
√
~
20V ωk
[
aˆkλ exp (−iωkt+ ik · r) + aˆ†kλ exp (iωkt− ik · r)
]
(3.18)
Using Eq. (3.14) and (3.18), the Hamiltonian operator Hˆ takes the following expres-
sion:
HˆR =
∑
k
∑
λ
~ω
(
aˆ†kλaˆkλ +
1
2
)
(3.19)
where the R stands for “Radiation”. [39]
3.2.2 Photodetection
According to what said in Subsec. (3.2.1), there are two fundamentals physical quanti-
ties that quantum optics uses to relate photodetection properties and a source of light
radiation: the mean and variance of incident photons flux. [39] Before going into details
it is necessary to introduce the “photons number” concept detected by a device. For a
detector that integrates the incident photons flux over a time interval T, the photons
number may be computed with the following operator:
Mˆ(t, T ) =
t+T∫
t
dt
′
fˆ(t
′
) =
t+T∫
t
dt
′
aˆ†(t
′
)aˆ(t
′
) (3.20)
Normal system are of course not ideal. There exist many phenomenons that prevent
a total conversion of incident photons in “photocounts”. That is why it is introduced
a parameter that takes into account all the “imperfections” of the device: quantum
efficiency. A simple model that shows the meaning of quantum efficiency is the one
showed in Fig. (3.1). An ideal detector is preceded by a BS (Beam Splitter) with
transmission and reflective coefficients:
R = i(1− η)1/2 and T = η1/2 (3.21)
so to satisfy the following conditions:
| R |2 + | T |2= 1
RT ∗ +R∗T = 0
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aˆ(t) rˆ(t)
vˆ(t)
R
1
2
3
4
Figure 3.1: Simple scheme of an inefficient photodetector showing the input field aˆ(t)
entering on the left, the beam splitter with quantum efficiency η and the
ideal detector R.
Referring to Fig. 3.1, the radiation, parameterized by the operator aˆ(t), enters in arm
1. The operator vˆ(t),representing the continuum vacuum state, enters in arm 2. The
detector R registers only the radiation coming out in arm 4, rˆ(t), while the remaining
is lost in arm 3. This way, rˆ(t) may be rewritten using Eq. (3.21):
rˆ(t) = η
1/2 aˆ(t) + i(1− η)1/2 vˆ(t) (3.22)
Similarly to Eq. (3.20), the new photocount operator takes the same form except for
the fact that this time the incoming field operator is rˆ(t):
MˆR(t, T ) =
t+T∫
t
dt
′
rˆ†(t
′
)rˆ(t
′
) (3.23)
The “photocounts” mean then becomes:
〈m〉 =
〈
MˆR(t, T )
〉
= η
〈
Mˆ(t, T )
〉
(3.24)
where m identifies the counts number and the angle brackets the quantum expectation
value. The second factorial momentum than is:
〈m(m− 1)〉 =
〈
Mˆ2D(t, T )
〉
=
t+T∫
t
dt
′
t+T∫
t
dt
′′
〈
rˆ†(t
′
)rˆ†(t
′′
)rˆ(t
′′
)rˆ(t
′
)
〉
(3.25)
As a consequence of the model, the relations between the mean value and second
momentum of the “photocounts” and the photons number of the incident light are the
same as that of a standard BS.
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This way, the expression for the photocount distribution variance is:
(∆m)2 = η2
〈
∆Mˆ2(t, T )
〉
+ η(1− η)
〈
Mˆ(t, T )
〉
(3.26)
where the first contribution on the r.h.s is the variance of the photons number of the
radiation hitting the detector, represented by the operator in Eq. (3.20) scaled by the
square quantum efficiency. The second contribution instead is a “partition noise” re-
sulting from the random selection of a fraction η of the incident photons by the defective
detector.
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4 System’s noise models
For a more realistic model, it has to be taken into account all the perturbation effects
that modify the analysis of a physical system. In common light radiation detection
using SPADs, three are the principal phenomenons that characterize the electric noise
of a detector: optical crosstalk, dark count and afterpulsing. The chapter introduces
the concepts of crosstalk, dark count and afterpulsing dwelling on the methods used to
defined them.
4.1 Optical Crosstalk
Single photon avalanche detectors, SPADs, fall under the category of silicon-based pho-
tomultipliers (SiPMs). Every component or pixel, of the SPAD array that makes the
detector (see Sec. (5.2)), produces an impulse of constant amplitude. The pulse is then
registered, analogically or digitally, through the same output channel giving a signal pro-
portional to the sum of the single pixels. Unfortunately, the count resolution is strongly
limited by the crosstalk effect which modifies the linear response of the device. [40] This
perturbation then produces an increase of the electronic noise. When a pixel creates
a signal, thanks to a detected photon or a thermal generation, the carriers induce a
secondary emission of IR (Infra-Red) photons that may subsequently creates other hot
carriers in a near region. Fig. (4.1) shows an example of this kind of process.
Figure 4.1: Example of optical crosstalk between two detectors, A and B. When a pri-
mary photon starts an avalanche on the A SPAD, IR photons may be emitted
and propagate through the detector. If these photons interact with the B
SPAD they may generate a secondary avalanche.
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This stochastic process is called optical crosstalk. The phenomenon occurs almost
instantaneously with probability proportional to the SiPM gain. The probability, ε, is
usually defined as the ratio of the dark counts that have generated crosstalk and the total
dark counts rate. To calculate ε it has been adopted the geometric model developed by
Spanish researchers (L. Gallego, J. Rosado, F. Blanco, F. Arqueros - “Modeling crosstalk
in silicon photomultipliers” [41], which includes sequential avalanche generations effects.
(a) Probability for 1 successful crosstalk event (red filled circle).
(b) Probability for 2 successful crosstalk event (red and green filled circle).
Figure 4.2: Crosstalk histories for a system of 2 neighbors. Given a crosstalk event (yel-
low filled circle), the primary pixel (red filled circle) generates a sequence of
crosstalk events (green filled circle). If a crosstalk events does not generates
another one (dashed grey circle), the cascading sequence stops and the cor-
responding probability is calculated in terms of multinomial combinations.
The model defines a binomial distribution to describe s successful events of crosstalk
for a set of n neighbors of the primary pixel:1
P (s) =
(
n
s
)
ps(1− p)n−s (4.1)
where p indicates the probability that a primary avalanche may induces a secondary
one in an adjacent pixel. This parameter is related to ε as following:
P (1) = (1− p)n = 1− ε (4.2)
1The distribution reduces to a Bernoulli distribution for n = 1 and tends to a Poissonian with mean
λ = − log(1− ε) for n→∞ keeping ε constant.
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The probability of successful crosstalk events for n neighbors pixel is obtained applying
repeatedly Eq. (4.1) for each pixel of the detector assuming that a primary (or secondary,
tertiary...) pixel may generate a successful crosstalk event. Through these assumptions,
the probability of obtaining j crosstalk events is proportional to the number of “histories”
with j − 1 crosstalk events. All the records are obtained considering all the possible
combination of “on and off” neighbors. Fig. (4.2) schematically represents the process
up to a maximum of 2 crosstalk events for a model of n = 2 neighbors. For an arbitrary
number of n neighbors and j crosstalk events, the probability is:
P (j) = hn,j−1pj−1(1− p)jn−j+1 (4.3)
where hn,j−1 defines the numbers of crosstalk “histories” summed up to the (j− 1)-th
for n neighbors. Although calculating hn,j−1 is computationally hard for a large n and
j, it is possible to generalized the formula with the following recursive method:
hn,e =
e∑
l=1
(
n
l
) e−l∑
i1=0
hn,i1
e−l−i1∑
i2=0
hn,i2 · · ·
e−l−i1− ···−il−2∑
il−1=0
hn,il−1hn,e−l−i1− ···−il−1 (4.4)
assuming hn,0 = 1.
It is remarkable to notice that the inclusion, or not, of avalanches effects does not
influence the total probability of crosstalk, ε. As a matter of fact, the probability relies
only on the original binomial distribution that a primary pixel will not induce any
crosstalk event. [41]
4.2 Dark Count
SPADs are detectors that operate biased at a voltage VA well above breakdown voltage
VB for an amount of time sufficient to guarantee the creation of an avalanche. At this
bias, the electric field is so high that a single charge carrier injected into the junction
can trigger a self-sustaining avalanche [42]. The current rises rapidly to a steady level
in the milliampere range (∼ mA)2. Ideally, the system should not produce any signal
in “dark regimen”3. In real devices, hot carriers may induce a hole-electron pair which
may lead to a signal generation because of the Geiger working mode of SPADs. When
this situation occurs, the fake signal is misinterpreted as a good one offsetting the whole
analysis. The dark count rate, µ, representing the counts number of dark events per
unit time, quantifies the phenomenon. Assuming the rate to be portrayed by a Poisson
statistic, the rate is estimated as following:
µ = −1
τ
ln
(
1− NC
NG
)
(4.5)
2The amplitude of the signal reaches this range because the detectors are operated in Geiger mode
with a gain factor, Mg, of order 10
6 − 108.
3No incoming radiation.
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where NC is the mean number of dark count, NG the total frames number for a single
acquisition and τ the time of integration. It is important to stress out that the dark
count rate is heavily influenced by the working temperature of the device. Working at
low temperatures reduce the hot carriers generation (hole-electron pairs) responsible for
the fake produced signal. Fig. (4.3) depicts a dark count rate-temperature relation for
a SPAD.
Figure 4.3: Example of the relationship between dark count rate and working temper-
ature. As the temperature lowers, the rate decreases becoming zeros at
T = −273.15 ◦C. This graphic shows the equivalent form of the dark count
rate expressing it as counts number per unit time per squared millimeter,
[kHz/mm2]. (Courtesy of KETEK GmbH, Mu¨nchen)
4.3 Afterpulsing
The Afterpulsing phenomenon falls under the “dark count second generation” definition.
During the avalanche process some carriers (hole or electrons) may sink to deep levels
present in the depletion region of the p-n junction subsequently released at random.
The time interval between releases is a stochastic process around a common mean value
that depends on the characteristics of the deep levels. These carriers may then produce
secondary avalanches correlated to the primary one thus causing an afterpulsing effect.
[43] The number of captured carriers, during an impulse, increase as the total number
of carriers that cross the junction increases. As a result, the afterpulsing amplifies as
the delay time of the avalanche quenching and the applied voltage increase.
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Usually, these features are correlated to the quantum efficiency or the time resolution
needed for a particular device. [42]
Figure 4.4: Example of the relationship between the amplitude of a signal generated by
an avalanche and the reading time. The red circled zone indicates where
the time correlation of signal may occur. As the applied voltage increases,
the system can not rapidly quench the signal resulting in the creation of a
secondary avalanche correlated to the first one.
Fig. (4.4) shows a typical trend of the relationship between the output current and
the reading time of a photomultipliers’ signal. When the applied voltage4 raises, the
system’s quenching can no longer stop the avalanche thus inducing a possible secondary
avalanche.
4The voltage has to be greater than the breakdown limit otherwise a photoelectron can not trigger an
avalanche process.
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5 Setup
This chapter presents the experimental set-up used for the photon analysis of the system.
It will also be introduced the main characteristics of the different light sources employed
and those of the photodetector. The last part illustrates the arrangements taken for the
data acquisition.
5.1 Light sources: LASER and LED
The LASER sources employed is an LD (Laser Diode) semiconductor with a near in-
frared spectrum emission (λ = 808nm). The system connects to a Single Mode (SM)
optic fiber through which the radiation propagates. The standard output of the fiber
allows it to be attached to many anchoring devices on the optical bench. The LASER
is operated by an LDC (Laser Diode Controller) that provides extreme precision at the
current level of operation and absolute control over working temperature. Fig. (5.1)
shows the LASER source while Fig. (5.2) shows the technical specifications of construc-
tion.
Figure 5.1: The LD semiconductor of operative wavelength λ = 808nm.
The LED (Light Emitting Diode) source used is made of a simple p-n junction (see
Fig. (5.3)) using gallium nitride (GaN) as semiconductor which is commonly employed
for blue light spectrum emission. The reason for the usage of this kind of light source
lies in the fact that the quantum efficiency of the detector reaches a maximum value
in the wavelength interval (420 - 490nm) (see Fig. (5.7)). The wavelength of the LED
source is λ = 470nm. Fig. (5.4) shows the functioning LED source.
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Figure 5.2: Technical specifications of the LD semiconductor.
Figure 5.3: Schematic representation of a p-n junction used for a LED source.
5.2 Detector
For the analysis and detection of photons emitted by the light sources it has been used a
single photon detector camera, SPC2 gently provided by the Micro Photon Devices S.r.l.
of Bolzano (see Fig. (5.5)). [44] The camera is based on a 2-D imaging array of 32x32
smart pixels (see Fig. (5.6)). Each pixel includes an SPAD (Single Photon Avalanche
Diode) detector, an AFE (Analog Front-End) and a digital processing electronics. This
configuration allows a “single photon” sensitivity, high electronic noise immunity and a
fast readout speed of the signal.
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Figure 5.4: The LED source of operative wavelength lambda = 470nm.
The system operates at a maximum frame rate of 49000 fps with negligible interframe
dead time. This camera varies from the conventional CCD (Charge-Coupled Device)
or CMOS (Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor) sensors for it performs an
entirely digital acquisition of the light signal. Each pixel effectively counts the number
of photons that are detected by the sensor during the acquisition time. It features an
high photon detection efficiency in the visible spectral region and a low dark count rate
even at room temperature (see Fig. (5.7)).
Figure 5.5: SPC2 detector.
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Figure 5.6: Detection region of the SPC2 camera. The zone is an array of 32x32 smart
pixels each including an SPAD.
Figure 5.7: Relation between the SPC2 quantum efficiency and the wavelength of the
incident light beam.
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Figure 5.8: Technical draws of the SPC2 camera.
Figure 5.9: Schematic representation of the acquisition data configuration for the
LASER source.
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5.3 Acquisition data configuration
Each data acquisition depends mainly on two simple parameters: the working power of
the light source (LASER or LED) and the relative distance between the detector and
the source itself. The working power allows to retrieve information about the photon
distribution of the system (Gaussian beam for the LASER, uniform distribution for
the LED). The relative distance gives information about the light beam behavior and
dynamic after the free space propagation (the space dependence is express by the z
parameter for the LASER (see Eq. (6.1)) and it is already accounted for in the Ar
parameter of Eq. (6.8) for the LED source). Fig. (5.9) reports a schematic representation
of the acquisition data configuration adopted for the LASER source. Referring to the
figure: the LASER source (a), connected to the LDC (b), generates the radiation that
is collected into the optical fiber (c). The fiber is then secured to a coupling device (d)
directly attached to the optical bench on the same axis as of the camera’s (e). The
coupling device is a translator with micrometer drives that permit to translate the fiber
transversely and parallel to the optic bench manually adjusting the relative distance
with the camera. Fig. (5.10), instead, shows the acquisition data configuration for the
LED source. For this light source, the LED (a) is powered by a voltage generator (b)
and directly secured on the coupling device (d) always in axis with the camera (e).
Figure 5.10: Schematic representation of the acquisition data configuration for the LED
source.
38

6 Quantum efficiency
To develop a QRNG model, it is necessary to possess a maximal knowledge about the
photodetection device used for the photons analysis. Some of its features, in primis
quantum efficiency, play a fundamental role for a proper study of a system. The first
part of this chapter shows the analysis made to parameterize the LASER and LED
sources. The middle and last part covers a brief return to quantum photodetection
theory and its relationship with the quantum efficiency of the detector.
6.1 Detector analysis
The SPC2 camera includes a software application that allows the user to modify the ac-
quisition settings. Some of these configurations are: variable integration time, system’s
dead time, (thermal and electric) background subtraction algorithm. The parameters
were chosen so that each pixel would not detect more than one photon per frame. This
way the system precisely represented the theoretical model expressed in Chap. (1). It is
important to point out that the settings allow a “single photon detection” for each work-
ing power or distance configuration between the camera and the light sources. Working
in “sampling mode”, the camera acquired a total of 131043 frames (see Fig. (6.1)).
Figure 6.1: A single frame acquisition. The red-filled entries corresponds to a single
detection while the blue-filled to none.
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The integration time for each frame was of 200 ns for a total acquisition time of
2,67 s. All the frames were then saved as TIFF file subsequently converted in matrices
of 32x32 entries to faithfully reproduce the camera.1 As introduced in Sec. (5.3) the
measurements were made for different LASER and LED working powers and distance
configurations together with a background acquisition. Summing all the single frames
reproduces the light beam intensity profile. For the LASER source the image resembles
a TEM00 because of the Gaussian shape of the LASER output while an almost constant
distribution for the LED. The images in Fig. (6.2) shows saturation effects due to the
presence of some pixels that generate noise (thermal, electronic, crosstalk, afterpulsing,
dark count, etc. . . ).
(a) LASER intensity profile (b) LED intensity profile
Figure 6.2: Images of all frames summed up. For the LASER source it is evident the
Gaussian shape of the intensity profile while for the LED an almost constant
distribution.
To account for these pixels it has been made an histogram using the background
samples (see Fig. (6.3)). The x axis shows the single pixel counts while the y axis shows
the frequencies with which they occur. The red circled zone in Fig. (6.3a) highlights the
pixels that deviate from the mean value more than 3σ. Tab. (6.1) reports the selected
pixels. All of them were then compared with the one extracted from all the other
acquisitions so to mark the ones that were present in every sample.
1See Sec. (5.2) for technical specifications.
41
CHAPTER 6. QUANTUM EFFICIENCY
(a) Distribution before discarding
pixels
(b) Distribution after discarding pix-
els
Figure 6.3: Histograms relative to a background acquisition.
Through the usage of a software, expressly made for the purpose, the selected pixels
were removed from the matrices. Fig. (6.3b) shows the result of the software imple-
mentation. In Fig. (6.4) are reproduced the same acquisitions of Fig. (6.2) after this
analysis.
Pixel Acquisition
Row Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 1 X X X X X X X X X X
2 2 X X X X X X X X X X
3 1 X X
8 21 X X X X X X
9 3 X X X X X X X X X X
14 25 X X X X X X X X X X
26 9 X X X X X
27 8 X X X X X X X X X X
Table 6.1: Table of selected pixels. A check mark indicates if the pixel was found on
that particular acquisition.
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(a) LASER intensity profile after dis-
carding pixels
(b) LED intensity profile after dis-
carding pixels
Figure 6.4: Light sources profiles after discarding pixels. The two different profiles are
now sharper than those of Fig. (6.2).
Taking in exam the LASER source, four variables are needed to fully parameterize it:
the waist W0, the operative wavelength (λ = 808nm), the distance of sampling relative
to the optical fiber output z and the working power P.2 All these parameters define the
intensity profile according to the following formula:
I(x, y, z) =
2P
piW 2(z)
exp
[
−2(x− x0)
2 + 2(y − y0)2
W 2(z)
]
(6.1)
W (z) = W0
√
1 +
(
z
z0
)2
z0 =
piW 20
λ
To validate the assumption of “Gaussian profile” it has been extracted a section of the
image in correspondence to the intensity peak. Performing a fit of the extracted data
using Eq. (6.1) demonstrated the reason behind the previous assumption. Fig. (6.5)
shows the section relative to an acquisition of working power P = 1.154µW and sampling
distance of z = 2.5 cm.3
2To determine the value of the working power P it has been used a Power Meter placed close to the
camera.
3The fit of the data has been made normalizing the experimental and theoretical distributions.
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Figure 6.5: Fit of the LASER intensity profile section in correspondence of the intensity
peak. The data and fitting equation were normalized.
From the good agreement between the data and Eq. (6.1) a 3-D fit was made (see
Fig. (6.6)) extracting the three parameters: the centroids (x0, y0) and waistW0. Tab. (6.2)
shows the results.
x0 y0 Waist
1.74± 0.02× 10−3 m 1.86± 0.02× 10−3 m 2.52± 0.08× 10−6 m
Table 6.2: Parameters extracted from the 3-D fit of the LASER intensity profile.
The waist parameter reported in Tab. (6.2) refers to a single acquisition fit. In fact,
most of the acquisition fits, reported different values of W0, in most cases even not
compatible with each others. This fact could be attributed to a misalignment of the
light source or the camera especially for lower working powers (∼ nW ) . It was then
decided to discard some of the values to reduce the fluctuations to a maximum 10 % and
to extract a reasonable waist value. This way the mean value is:
W0 = 2.83± 0.08× 10−6 m (6.2)
Having all the information about the LASER source, it is now possible to focus on
the quantum efficiency of the camera. Exploiting the working mechanics of the SPC2
it may be desirable to shift the analysis to the photodetection statistic theory. Using
the information expressed in Sec. (3.2), it is possible to relate the statistical light source
photons emission with the statistical photodetection of a device.
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Figure 6.6: 3-D Gaussian fit of the LASER intensity profile.
Let (∆N)2 be the photodetection variance and (∆n)2 the one relative to the light
source photons emission. The two variances are then bound to satisfy the following
relation:4
(∆N)2 = η2 (∆n)2 + η (1− η)n (6.3)
where n is the incident photons number mean, η is the detector’s quantum efficiency
defined as η = N
n
and N is the photodetection number mean.
A remarkable consequence follows from Eq. (6.3): if the incident light is characterized
by a Poissonian distribution with (∆n)2 = n, then (∆N)2 = η n = N for every value
of η. In other words, the photodetection statistics always coincides with a Poissonian
distribution. Assuming that the LASER beam may be regarded as a light source of
Poissonian photons distribution is widely supported by the coherent states study of
a quantum system.5 To better test this hypothesis it was decided to run a statistic
analysis on all the acquired frames. The frames were summed up to different sequence
lengths making an histogram of the results. Fig. (6.7a) shows the relation between
the experimental distribution for a 11 frames sum (blue colored) and the theoretical
Poissonian distribution with mean λ = 2.03 (red colored). Fig. (6.7b) instead shows
an experimental distribution for a 121 frames sum and the theoretical one with mean
λ = 22.3. Looking at Fig. (6.7), it is clear that the assumption of Poissonian distribution
is well justified.
4To a more detailed derivation see Sec. (3.2).
5A more detailed relation is reported in App. (A).
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(a) Experimental distribution of a 11
frames sum and theoretical distri-
bution with mean λ = 2.03
(b) Experimental distribution of a 121
frames sum and theoretical distri-
bution with mean λ = 22.3
Figure 6.7: Relationship between the experimental and theoretical distributions of pho-
todetection. The blue distributions refer to the experimental ones while the
red distributions to the theoretical.
According to the results obtained so far and the camera settings (one photodetection
per frame and pixel) the photodetection probability Priv is:
Priv = 1− P (0) (6.4)
where P (0) corresponds to the probability of no photodetection. Writing explicitly
the Poisson distribution
P (n) = eλ
λn
n!
(6.5)
as a function of the photons number mean per unit frame and pixel N and of the
quantum efficiency η, Eq. (6.4) becomes:
η = − 1
n
log
(
1−N) (6.6)
where n is the incident photons number per unit frame and pixel. n was then retrieved
using the following standard relations between energy, optical intensity and power:
P · Ar = E
T
E =
nhc
λ
where T is the integration time of a single frame (200ns), h and c are the Planck
constant and the speed of light respectively, λ is the wavelength of the optical radiation,
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P is the working power of the LASER source rescaled by the Ar factor as the ratio of
a single SPAD area and the total optical area of the camera.6 This way the intensity
profile of Eq. (6.1) takes the following form:
n(x, y, z) =
2PλTAr
hcpiW 2(z)
exp
[
−2(x− x0)
2 + 2(y − y0)2
W 2(z)
]
(6.7)
Integrating Eq. (6.7) relatively to each pixel area and inserting the result in Eq. (6.6),
a quantum efficiency “per pixel” was retrieved. Fig. (6.8) shows the values for a single
acquisition. The overall quantum efficiency is the same for the most part of pixels
confirming the validity of the previous theories and assumptions. Exploiting an average
on all the pixels, a quantum efficiency relative to the LASER wavelength (λ = 808nm)
is retrieved:
η = 5.47± 0.38 %
The result shows a good compatibility with the theoretical value provided by the
camera producer (see Fig. (5.7)).
Figure 6.8: Quantum efficiency per pixel relative to a single acquisition for the LASER
source.
6The rescaling factor is introduced because not the entirety of the camera allows a photodetection. To
a more detailed explanations see Sec. (5.2).
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Taking now in exam the LED source, the same analysis procedures were made on the
system revising the new nature of the optical radiation. The LED radiation does not
possess a well-defined intensity profile but shows a chaotic nature of emission instead
while maintaining a high monochromaticity. These characteristics make the LED an
excellent uniformly emitting light source. Accounting for these considerations, Eq. (6.7)
becomes:
n =
PArTλ
hc
(6.8)
maintaining the same variables relations with the exception of the wavelength, now
λ = 470nm, and of Ar that now corresponds to the ratio of a single SPAD area and the
active area of the Power Meter. The reason behind the last change is because of the no
more spatial confinement of the light radiation. Placing the Power Meter close to the
camera allows to register the exact portion of light that falls in the camera objective
accounting for the spatial diffusion of the radiation. As it was done for the LASER
acquisitions, it was retrieved a section of a “LED image” observing the intensity profile
of the radiation measured. Fig. (6.9) shows the section of a single acquisition relative
to a working power of P = 2.816µW and at a sampling distance of z = 15 cm.7 The
intensity profile results constant validating the previous hypotheses.
Figure 6.9: Fit of the LED intensity profile section. The data and fitting equation were
normalized.
7As it was done for the LASER source, the fit was made after normalizing the data.
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Contrarily to the LASER source, the photoemission statistic is no more described by
a Poissonian distribution because of the different light emission. Despite this fact, the
system still follows Eq. (6.3). That is because, in a semiclassical approximation, the
photodetection statistic is expressed by a Poissonian distribution. In fact, the photode-
tection process meets the following conditions:
 The probability of the emission of a photoelectron in a short time interval ∆t is
proportional to the intensity I, the area A illuminated and the time interval ∆t
 If ∆t is sufficiently small, the probability of emitting two photoelectrons is negli-
gibly small
 Photoemission events registered in different time intervals are statistically inde-
pendent of each other
Applying the same analysis, it was retrieved a quantum efficiency “per pixel” shown in
Fig. (6.10).
Figure 6.10: Quantum efficiency per pixel relative to a single acquisition for the LED
source.
The average on all the pixels gives the following quantum efficiency for a wavelength
of (λ = 470nm):
η = 41.4± 0.21 %
Even in this case there is good accordance with the theoretical value provided by the
camera producer (see Fig. (5.7)).
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7 Experimental system’s noises
This chapter shows the analysis made to account for the optical crosstalk, dark count
and afterpulse effects present in every realistic devices.
7.1 Crosstalk
The crosstalk model, presented in Sec. (4.1), allows to compute the successful event
probability relying on the intrinsic binomial distribution for a pixel activation and on
the “histories” of cascading events generated by a primary pixel. The experimental
setup and the camera’s acquisition settings allow to directly analyze the “background”
obtained for each power-distance configuration (see Sec. (4.1)). Expanding Eq. (4.3) till
j ≤ 5, for a generic number n of neighbors, it is possible to establish a maximum limit
of cascading events to determine the p parameter. Following are shown the calculated
expansions:
P (1) = (1− p)n = 1− ε
P (2) = np(1− p)2n−1
P (3) =
1
2
n(3n− 1)p2(1− p)3n−2
P (4) =
1
3
n(8n2 − 6n+ 1)p3(1− p)4n−3
P (5) =
1
4
n
(
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6
n2 − 25n2 + 55
6
n− 1
)
p4(1− p)5n−4
To analyze the 32x32 array it is necessary to apply a recognition algorithm that
prevents to double count a specific history for two different triggered pixel. For example,
assuming a as primary pixel, the secondary b pixel will be activated if there is a crosstalk
event, but it is not true for the reverse process. In fact, the b pixel is not the product of
the a pixel (a→ b 6= a← b). To investigate the system’s geometry using an “8 neighbors
scheme” (see Fig. (7.1)), it has been crated a mask that could account for all the system’s
criterion. Fig. (7.2) shows the mask applied to the array of pixels color-filled to underline
the difference between the algorithm used. The blue pixels use the algorithm shown in
Fig. (7.3a), the azure that of Fig. (7.3b), the green that of Fig. (7.3c), the orange that
of Fig. (7.3d) while the red pixel does not use any algorithm.
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(a) 4 neighbors (b) 8 “L” shaped neighbors
(c) 8 neighbors (d) all neighbors
Figure 7.1: Possible configuration for the geometric analysis of the crosstalk effect. The
blue-filled pixel is the primary pixel, the red-filled pixels are the selected
pixels for the crosstalk analysis. The adopted configuration for the system
is that of 8 neighbors (c).
Figure 7.2: Crosstalk analysis mask. For every color-filled pixel, corresponds a different
algorithm of crosstalk analysis.
After applying the different algorithms for each pixel to all the 131043 acquisition
frames, the successful crosstalk events were recorded and highlighted. Fig. (7.4) reports
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the results of such analysis. Different zones of the image possess greater contrast of
others suggesting that the crosstalk effect is more frequent. Such system, however, does
not provide which of the most intense pixel is the cascading generator. In fact, it is not
possible to distinguish between the two “time reversal histories” [(i→ j) or (i← j)].
(a) blue pixel (b) azure pixel
(c) green pixel
(d) orange pixel
Figure 7.3: Rappresentation of the different algorithms used to the crosstalk analysis.
Each different color-filled pixel in Fig. (7.2) corresponds to one of the algo-
rithms.
Figure 7.4: Image of successful crosstalk events relative to the lighting of a secondary
pixel. Around the most intense pixels there are brighter zones indicating
that these pixels too have triggered other successful crosstalk events.
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To achieve a more precise calibration the system has been adjusted to account for
events that triggered at least three cascading pixel. This way, the primary pixel will
be highlighted among the rest giving a privileged direction to the cascading process.
Fig. (7.5) shows the results for this setting. Iterating the process for “more cascades”,
the probability decreases rapidly in magnitude until no crosstalk events are detected.
Fig. (7.6) shows the results for a three cascading events analysis. At the next level (four
cascading events) no more pixels are selected. The quickness with which the probability
ε decreases of magnitude for increasing cascading triggered pixels is shown in Fig. (7.7).
Already after just one secondary triggered pixel the probability decreases by almost three
orders of magnitude. The maximum value of the crosstalk probability has been used to
not underrate the later entropy and random extraction analysis: ε = 9.67× 10−2.
Figure 7.5: Image of successful crosstalk events relative to the lighting of two secondary
pixels. The brighter zones of Fig. (7.4) are almost vanished. The remaining
pixels are the effective primary pixels responsible for the cascading events.
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Figure 7.6: Image of successful crosstalk events relative to the lighting of three secondary
pixels. Only one pixel meets the system’s conditions.
Figure 7.7: Relation between the crosstalk probability and the secondary triggered pix-
els. The probability decreases by almost three orders of magnitude going
from one to two secondary triggered pixels.
55
CHAPTER 7. EXPERIMENTAL SYSTEM’S NOISES
7.2 Dark count
As depicted in Sec. (4.2), the dark count effect is relative to the generation of thermal
carriers (electrons-holes). These particles may trigger an avalanche emission creating a
false signal causing an increase of the electronic noise. Using the “background” frames it
is possible to directly analyze the number of events produced by a false signal, i.e. dark
count effect, thus determining the ratio NC
NG
(see Eq. (4.5)). Knowing that the integration
time of a single frame is τ = 200ns and the total number of frames is NG = 131043, the
mean dark count rate is: µ = 27428 cps. Fig. (7.8) shows the µ values for each pixel.
Figure 7.8: Dark count rate per pixel.
7.3 Afterpulsing
The afterpulsing effect comes from the inability of the device to quench an avalanche
event before the next sampling. This results in the fact that different events are now
correlated affecting the entire analysis. A similar process to that of the dark count
rate permits to quantify the phenomenon. This time a temporal correlation substitutes
the spatial correlation. The system is set so that, for each pixel, a double or triple
triggered pixels in the next frames are selected and accounted for the afterpulse effect.
The probability thus becomes:
γ = − log
(
1− NA
NG
)
(7.1)
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where NA is the number of successful afterpulsing events. Fig. (7.9) shows the values
γ for each pixel.
Figure 7.9: Afterpulsing probability per pixel.
As for the dark count rate, it has been chosen the maximum value of γ, that is:
γ = 4.29 %.
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8 Entropy
A parameter to test the quality of a QRNG is the information entropy. Its usage is
to “quantify” a variable’s randomness prior its measurement. The first section presents
the entropy analysis made on the system focusing on the theoretical model expressed
in Chap. (1). The second section instead presents the model for a generic number of
detectors and its analysis.
8.1 Entropy analysis
It is possible to “quantify” the amount of information contained in a message through
the usage of the entropy concept. The meaning of entropy may also be expressed as
the quantity of uncertainty about a system before performing a measurement. In the
Information Theory exists different type of entropy, but three are the most used in every-
day experiments: the Shannon Entropy, the Conditioned min-Entropy and the Classical
min-Entropy.1
The Shannon Entropy gives an upper limit to the length of a lossless compressed bit
string defined as:
HS(X) = −
∑
x
PX(x) log2 PX(x) (8.1)
where in the presence of side information, i.e. the variables that characterize the
photons detector or the light source, Eq. (8.1) becomes:
HS(X|W ) =
∑
w∈W
PW (w)H(X|W = w) (8.2)
where W represents a variable that accounts for all side information of the system.
The Conditioned min-Entropy instead provides a lower limit according to the following
formula:
Hmin(X|w) = − log2
[
max
x
PX|W (x|w)
]
(8.3)
where W is the same variable of Eq. (8.2).
1Commonly the entropy concept is referred not only to string of bits but any type of system and
information such as the letters in a message or the colors used in a painting.
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The Classical min-Entropy2 takes its name from the fact that no side information are
taken into consideration and the system is considered completely deterministic. The
system just computes the probability of all possible outputs, i.e. 0 or 1 for a bit string,
and then defines its entropy as:
H∞(X) = − log2
[
max
x
PX(x)
]
(8.4)
Making use of these functions and applying the “Leftover Hash Lemma with Side
Information” (see Sec. (1.2)) permits to retrieve bit strings that are, with excellent
approximation, truly random. Side information alters the system and the randomness
extracted, allowing to perform two different “methods”: a quantum and classical ap-
proach. From the point of view of the classical approach, the system may be compared
to the simple “flipping coin” problem. The device, in fact, gives a sequence of 1s or
0s in correspondence of a detection or not. That is the same as looking at the result
of a flipped coin: “head” or “tail”. This configuration than quantify the uncertainty
about the system itself. It is important, however, to stress out that Entropy is not
information. Entropy just gives a knowledge of the system and helps to quantify the
“uncertainty about the source of information”. In other words, the less likely an event
is, i.e. head or tail, 0 or 1, the more information it provides when it occurs. The method
used to perform all acquisitions (see Sec. (5.3)) permits to split the analysis in two
different ways: spatial and temporal.
(a) Spatial analysis (b) Temporal analysis
Figure 8.1: Representation of the two different pixels extraction methods. The spatial
extraction allows to extract each row of the 32x32 array of pixels from all
131043 frames. The temporal extraction allows to extract each pixel from
the 131043 frames of each acquisition.
2The term “Classical” does not refer to a classical system but merely indicates that the entropy does
not account for any side information that might exist.
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Spatial analysis:
The spatial analysis consists in extracting each row of the 131043 arrays of pixels
creating a single string of 32x32x131043 pixels. This way the system permits to relate
the spatial photons distribution with the detection distribution of the entire active area.
Fig. (8.1a) shows an example of spatial extraction used in a single acquisition. This
kind of study is suitable only for the LED source because of its incoherent nature. The
LED light, in fact, does not possess a defined spatial intensity profile and each pixel is
independent of one another. The LASER distribution instead has a well defined spatial
distribution as Eq. (6.7) indicates. If the LASER acquisitions were to be analyzed using
this method, the request of independence would not be satisfied.
Temporal analysis:
The temporal analysis consists on extracting each pixel separately in all the 131043
frames available for a single acquisition. This method relies on the fact that there is
no temporal correlation between subsequent detections for a single pixel.3 Fig. (8.1b)
shows such extraction method.
Using both methods, it has been computed the Classical min-Entropy for varying
light source and working powers with the use of Eq. (8.4). Fig. (8.2) shows the results of
such calculus for both sources (LASER and LED). Observing Fig. (8.2a) and (8.2b) the
entropy goes to zero for lower value of power (∼ nW ) and then increase as the power
increase. This accurately reproduces the theoretical model: for lower power values there
is a higher probability of finding pixels with no detection, i.e. 0. In the limit case when
the probability is exactly 1, [P (X) = 1], the entropy is H∞(X) = − log2(1) = 0, as to
say that the system does not provide any more information, i.e. it is no longer necessary
to know if the system detected a photon or not because it is already known. When the
power increases, the system mirrors the previous setting because now the probability of
finding pixels with one detection is predominant. Entropy is maximum when there is
equal probability of finding pixels with one detection or not: P (X) = 0.5⇒ H∞(X) =
− log2(0.5) = 1. Fig. (8.3) shows the relation between Classical min-Entropy and the
probability of finding pixels with no detection.
3This is not the case when afterpulsing effects are predominant.
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(a) LASER source
(b) LED source
Figure 8.2: Classical min-Entropy for LASER and LED sources. The red data denote
the spatial extraction while the blue the temporal extraction.
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Figure 8.3: Relation between Classical min-Entropy and the probability of finding pixels
with no detection. The entropy is minimum when it is absolutely known the
output of a measurement, i.e. 1 or 0, [P (0) = P (1) = 1]. It is maximum
when the probabilities are equal [P (0) = P (1) = 0.5].
Figure 8.4: A PBS model of a QRNG. n incoming photons hit the PBS and are trans-
mitted (m) or reflected (n-m) according to their polarization. These photons
are then registered by two photodetectors (R1, R2).
The approaches so far do not account for the quantum nature of the system and do not
consider the possible outcomes of the system measurement. Adjusting then the entropy
analysis to the quantum system of the model described in Chap. (1), it is necessary
to determine the probability of all possible output using the PBS (Polarising Beam
Splitter) analogy shown in Sec. (1.3).
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Incident photons are reflected or transmitted according to their polarization and then
“seen” by two photodetectors (see Fig. (8.4)). Considering only two of the 1024 pixels of
each frame permits to treat the system exactly as the PBS model. One of the assump-
tions made is that the incident photons, n ∈ [0 . . .∞], reflect a Poissonian distribution
(see Eq. (6.5)). Enumerating the possible outcome of two photodetectors gives the fol-
lowing set of pairs: {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. Because the detectors are not ideal, a
photon detection occurs with probability η. Assuming, then, that n incident photons
hit the PBS, the probabilities of all possible outcome become:
(x1, x2) PX (x1, x2)
(1, 1)
∞∑
n=2
PN(n)
(
1− 2 (1
2
)n)
η2
(1, 0) 1
2
PN(1)η +
∞∑
n=2
PN(n)
[(
1
2
)n
η2 +
(
1− (1
2
)n)
η(1− η)]
(0, 1) 1
2
PN(1)η +
∞∑
n=2
PN(n)
[(
1
2
)n
η2 +
(
1− (1
2
)n)
η(1− η)]
(0, 0) PN(0) + PN(1)(1− η) +
∞∑
n=2
PN(n)
[
2
(
1
2
)n
(1− η) + (1− 2 (1
2
)n)
(1− η)2]
Table 8.1: Probabilities relative to all possible outcome for a system of n incoming pho-
tons and two detectors. x1, x2 represent the output of detector R1, R2 re-
spectively while PX is the probability relative to that particular combination
{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}.
To see how these probabilities have been determined, it is simpler to focus on the
expression for the (1, 1) output. This particular outcome may occur only when there
are at least two incoming photons and that is why the summation starts from two and
not 1. After the interaction with the PBS, photons must be present in both optical
paths, and this happen with probability 1 − 2 (1
2
)n
. This formulation arises from the
fact that the probability, of finding all photons in the same optical path, occurs with(
1
2
)n
probability. Assuming then that the detectors are not ideal, obtaining a double
revelation occurs with η2 probability. Adding all these together results exactly in the
formula in Tab. (8.1). Now searching the maximum probability, for different values
of λ of all the expressions in Tab. (8.1) gives the corresponding value of the Classical
min-Entropy.4 Fig. (8.5) shows the relation between probabilities of Tab. (8.1) and the
parameter λ for different quantum efficiency (η = 30% and η = 70%).
4Once again, the term “Classical” does not refer to a classical system but simply to a system that
does not account for any side information.
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(a) Probabilities for η = 30% (b) Probabilities for η = 70%
Figure 8.5: Probabilities of Tab. (8.1) for different values of λ and quantum efficiency
(η = 30% and η = 70%).
(a) Probabilities for η = 100% (b) Classical min-Entropy for η = 100%
Figure 8.6: Probabilities of Tab. (8.1) and Classical min-Entropy for different values of
λ for an ideal system (η = 100%).
Observing Fig. (8.5) it is straightforward how the efficiency plays a fundamental role
in the quantum system. This kind of behavior is easily explained. As the quantum
efficiency increases to its maximum value (η = 100%), the probability, of finding a signal
in both detectors, increases as the mean of incident photons increases. Fig. (8.6) shows
both the probabilities and the Classical min-Entropy for an ideal system (η = 100%).
The fact that the maximum of the Classical min-Entropy is 2 is consistent with the
system’s setting. In fact, when all possible outputs {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} are equally
probable, the information gained from the system is equal to the number of bits available
for one acquisition: 2. A further example on this matter is considering an 8 bit string.
If all the extractable number with these bits, {0, . . . , 255}, are equally probable to come
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out, the system’s entropy is exactly 8. Applying Eq. (8.4) to the maximum of all the
probabilities shown in Fig. (8.5), it is then extracted the corresponding Classical min-
Entropy (see Fig. (8.7)).
(a) Classical min-Entropy computed
for η = 30%
(b) Classical min-Entropy computed
for η = 70%
Figure 8.7: Classical min-Entropy for different values of λ and quantum efficiency
(η = 30% and η = 70%).
This new approach well defines the quantum nature of the system, but the information
extracted using the Classical min-Entropy does not ensure that an adversary may not
predict the behavior of the system. In fact, he could be in posses of information about the
system itself that allows him to change it as he sees fit. That is why any side information,
accessible to anyone, have to be taken into account. The theoretical model provides these
information in the contest of “Maximum Classical noise”. The side information thus are:
the number n of incoming photons and the two random variables, t1 and t2, that encode
the information whether the two detectors are sensitive or not. Through the use of
Eq. (8.3) and recalling that
2−Hmin(X|NT1T2) =
∑
n,t1,t2
PN(n)PT1(t1)PT2(t2)2
−Hmin(X|nt1t2)
where
Hmin (X|nt1t2) = − log2
[
max
x=(x1,x2)
PX|NT1T2(x|nt1t2)
]
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the Conditioned min-Entropy becomes:
Hmin (X|NT1T2) = − log2
[
PN(0) +
∞∑
n=1
PN(n) (A+B + C)
]
(8.5)
where

A = (1− η)2
B = 2η(1− η) (1− (1
2
)n)
C = η2 max
[(
1
2
)n
, 1− 2 (1
2
)n]
For the upper bound of extraction instead, the Shannon Entropy becomes:
HS(X|NT1T2) =
∑
n,t1,t2
PN(n)PT1(t1)PT2(t2)H(X|nt1t2) (8.6)
=
∞∑
n=1
PN(n) {2η(1− η) (−A log2A−B log2B)}
+
∞∑
n=1
PN(n) η
2 {−2A log2A− C log2C}
where

A =
(
1
2
)n
B =
(
1− (1
2
)n)
C =
(
1− 2 (1
2
)n)
Fig. (8.8) shows both entropies, the Conditioned min-Entropy and the (conditioned)
Shannon Entropy, in relation to λ (mean of the incident photons) for η = 30%. Now, the
value λ may be experimentally extracted using the notion expressed in Chap. (3) and
(6). Because λ physically represents the mean of the incident photons on the system,
this is exactly the n variable used to indicate the incoming photons from the LASER
and LED sources. This way, the quantum efficiency becomes:
η =
N
n
⇒ η = N
λ
Picking two adjacent pixels from the 32x32 array permits to approximate the same
mean of incident photons and then compute it thanks to the previous equation. Once ob-
tained the λ value, it is inserted in Eqs. (8.5) and (8.6) to retrieve the entropy. Fig. (8.9)
shows the relation between the experimental and theoretical values of both entropies for
different values of λ of the LASER source. The corresponding λ values have been con-
verted from the working power of the light source using the equations of Chap. (6).
Tab.(8.2) shows the converted values.5
5The values refer to a particular pair of pixels chosen from all the 1024 of each acquisition.
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Figure 8.8: Relation of the Conditioned min-Entropy and the (conditioned) Shannon
Entropy with the parameter λ for a quantum efficiency of η = 30%.
Figure 8.9: Relation between the experimental and theoretical values of both conditioned
entropies for different values of λ for the LASER source. The colored lines
refer to the theoretical values computed for a system of quantum efficiency
η = 5.47%.
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There is good accordance between the theoretical and experimental values denoting
the correct reasoning for the quantum system.
Power [W] λ
14.83× 10−9 0, 093
73.05× 10−9 0, 462
148.8× 10−9 0, 909
749.8× 10−9 3, 552
1.154× 10−6 4, 801
7.467× 10−6 9, 053
Table 8.2: Table of converted power values of the LASER source used to determine the
experimental data inserted in the graph of Fig. (8.9).
8.2 Generalized model
The theoretical model, so far, permits to quantify randomness in the presence of noise
conditioning the entropy on such side information. This method allows then to extract
variables that are uniformly distributed and noise-independent. The approach, however,
relies only on the simple system of two detectors and a PBS that deflects incoming
photons to the two devices. To develop the powerful model’s capacity, it is possible to
generalize the system to a generic l number of detectors and, of course, to n incoming
photons. The first step is computing the probabilities of all possible outputs for a given
number of detectors.
Suppose that there are l detectors, and that only k are 1 while the rest are 0. Suppose
also that, within the classical model, a detector “clicks” with probability η corresponding
to the quantum efficiency of the system. If n photons impinge on one of the l detectors,
the probabilities of obtaining 0 or 1, p0|n and p1|n respectively, are:
p0|n = δn + (1− η)(1− δn)
p1|n = η(1− δn) where
{
δn = 1 if n = 0
δn = 0 if n 6= 0
If the incoming photons are distributed according to a Poissonian distribution, Υµ(n),
with mean µ, it is possible to define a specific “spatial position” for the j th detector
with j = 1, . . . , l. This way, each device is “hit” by a Spatial Poissonian Φpjµ(n) with
mean pjµ, where pj is the intrinsic probability of the j th detector. In this case, the
probability that a detector produces a 0 is:
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P
(j)
0 =
∞∑
n=0
p0|nΦpjµ(n)
= Υpjµ(0) + (1− η)
∞∑
n=1
Υpjµ(n)
= e−pjµ + (1− η)
[ ∞∑
n=0
Υpjµ(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
− e−pjµ
]
= e−pjµ + (1− η)(1− e−pjµ)
= 1− η + η e−pjµ
Analogously the probability that a detector produces a 1 is:
P
(j)
1 =
∞∑
n=0
p1|nΦpjµ(n)
= η
∞∑
n=1
Υpjµ(n)
= η
[ ∞∑
n=0
Υpjµ(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
− e−pjµ
]
= η (1− e−pjµ)
Denoting by Qk the set of detectors that produced a 1 while Zl−k the set of detectors
that produced a 0, the probability that only k detectors produced a 1 is:
PQk = η
k
∏
j∈Qk
(1− e−pjµ)
∏
u∈Zl−k
(1− η + η e−pjµ)
with the condition that Qk + Zl−k = l.
When pj =
1
l
∀j, the previous equation simplifies to:
PQk = η
k(1− e−pjµ)k (1− η + η e−pjµ)l−k (8.7)
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(a) Probabilities for l = 4 and η = 60 %
(b) Classical min-Entropy for l = 4 and η = 60 %
Figure 8.10: Probabilities and Classical min-Entropy for a system with l = 4 and quan-
tum efficiency of η = 60 %. When all possible outputs are equally probable
(p = 1/16 = 0.0625) the entropy reaches its maximum: 4.
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The probabilities extracted using Eq. (8.7) corresponds to those of Tab. (8.1), this
time for a generic number of detectors. Fig. (8.10a) shows the probabilities for l = 4 for
a system of quantum efficiency η = 60%. Using these probabilities, however, permits to
retrieve the Classical min-Entropy, H∞(X) (see Fig. (8.10b)), and not the Conditioned
min-Entropy, Hmin(X|W ), that is needed to account for the side information. Then, the
next step is to compute the conditioned probabilities of all possible photons configuration
for a particular set of sensitive or insensitive devices. The task, however, is not simple,
and to show why it is, it is simpler to focus on a particular system so to have a better
understand on the matter.
l = 4 DETECTORS
Assuming that there are four detectors, the first part of the analysis is to determine
all possible configuration of Sensitive-Insensitive detectors. Tab. (8.4) summarizes the
configurations. The total number of configurations is the maximum computable number
with 4 bits: 16. The symmetry of the system, however, permits to use only a few of the
table’s entries because some of them produce the same results. For example consider all
the configurations with only one insensitive detector. Because the detectors are all the
same, the analysis’ result using table’s entry two will be the same as that of table’s entries
three, five and nine. In general, for s sensitive detectors and i insensitive detectors, the
number of same configurations is retrieved from the binomial coefficient:(
l
s
)
=
l!
(l − s)! s! =
l!
i! s!
where the condition (s + i = l) must be satisfied. Each of the table’s entries des-
ignate a particular system from which determine all the probabilities of each output
given the value of variables s, i, l and n. To understand how the process works, it is
better to focus on a specific output, say (1, 0, 1, 0). Of all the possible combination of
Sensitive-Insensitive, only three 6 allows to retrieve the desired output. Tab. (8.3) shows
these configurations. Splitting the problem in two parts permits to evaluate the wanted
probabilities. The first part, as previously stated, regards the study of all the possible
Sensitive-Insensitive configurations. The second part, instead focuses on the occupation
numbers of the detectors and all the potential arrangements of a given configuration.
6As previously stated, it is possible to analyze some of all the configurations in order to remove
redundancy on evaluating probabilities.
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Cases Detectors Photons configuration
I S S S S (> 0,= 0, > 0,= 0)
II S I S S (> 0,≥ 0, > 0,= 0)
III S I S I (> 0,≥ 0, > 0,≥ 0)
Table 8.3: Configurations of Sensitive-Insensitive detectors that allows to obtain the spe-
cific output {1, 0, 1, 0}. The photons configuration explain how the photons
may dispose in the detectors always yielding the same output.
Sensitive-Insensitive
S S S S
S S S I
S S I S
S S I I
S I S S
S I S I
S I I S
S I I I
I S S S
I S S I
I S I S
I S I I
I I S S
I I S I
I I I S
I I I I
Table 8.4: Configurations of Sensitive-Insensitive detectors for l = 4. The total number
of configurations correspond to the maximum computable number for 4 bit:
16.
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Probability of case I
The probability relative to the case must be evaluated for all those configurations
where n1 > 0, n3 > 0, n2 = 0 and n4 = 0.
7 Given n incoming photons, the configurations
are of the kind (n−m, 0,m, 0) with m ∈ {n−1, · · · , 1}. This corresponds to the “integer
partition” of n into two addends. For example, if n = 5, the appropriate configurations
are:
1 0 4 0 ↔ n = 5
2 0 3 0 ↔ n = 5
3 0 2 0 ↔ n = 5
4 0 1 0 ↔ n = 5
The total number of this kind of configurations is given by the number of ways to
distribute n photons in l
′
= 2 detectors decreased by the number of arrangements of all
the photons in a single detector:
l
′
=
(
n+ l
′ − 1
l′ − 1
)
− (l − l′)
(
n+ l
′ − 1
1
)
Considering the photons to be distinguishable [45], the probability is given by a sort
of multinomial distribution:
pI(1, 0, 1, 0) =
n−1∑
n3=1
n!
(n− n3)!n3!
1
4n
(8.8)
keeping in mind that each photon has intrinsic probability pi = 1/4 to fall into a
detector.8 For the specific case of n = 5:
pI(1, 0, 1, 0) =
1
1024
(5 + 10 + 10 + 5) =
15
512
In a more compact form, the probability may be written as follow:
pI(1, 0, 1, 0) = p(n1 > 0 ∩ n2 = 0 ∩ n3 > 0 ∩ n4 = 0) (8.9)
Probability of case II
In this case, one of the detectors is insensitive and may now receive any photons
because it will never detect them and still give the same output. Now, the configurations
of photons are those where n1 > 0, n3 > 0 and n4 = 0 for the sensitive detectors while
n2 ≥ 0 for the insensitive detector.
7The subscript refers to the specific detector.
8For a generic number l of detectors, the intrinsic probability is: pi = 1/l.
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Similarly to the previous case, the probability is:
pII(1, 0, 1, 0) =
n−1∑
n3=1
n−n3−1∑
n2=0
n!
(n− n2 − n3)!n2!n3!
1
4n
(8.10)
or in the more compact form
pII(1, 0, 1, 0) = p(n1 > 0 ∩ n2 ≥ 0 ∩ n3 > 0 ∩ n4 = 0) (8.11)
Considering the case with the fourth detector insensitive instead of the third would
have given the same result thanks to the system’s symmetry:
p(n1 > 0 ∩ n2 ≥ 0 ∩ n3 > 0 ∩ n4 = 0) ≡ p(n1 > 0 ∩ n2 = 0 ∩ n3 > 0 ∩ n4 ≥ 0)
Probability of case III
This time there are two insensitive detectors allowing both to receive any number of
photons since they can not detect them. The probability then becomes:
pIII(1, 0, 1, 0) =
n−1∑
n3=1
n−n3−1∑
n2=0
n−n2−n3−1∑
n4=0
n!
(n− n2 − n3 − n4)!n2!n3!n4!
1
4n
(8.12)
equivalently as
pIII(1, 0, 1, 0) = p(n1 > 0 ∩ n2 ≥ 0 ∩ n3 > 0 ∩ n4 ≥ 0)
The theory and methodical approaches so far illustrate how to compute the probability
for just one of all output made from l = 4 detectors. Computing all these probabilities for
all possible configurations (Active-Inactive) and outputs {(0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 0),
(0, 0, 1, 1), . . .} gives a “matrix” representation as shown in Fig. (8.11b). Fig. (8.11a)
shows a 3D image where the height of each bar correspond to the value of the probability
for a particular output and configuration. The two figures refer to a number of incoming
photons of n = 4. The particular shape of the “matrix” resembles that of an upper tri-
angular matrix. This is because in the lower-right zone the number of inactive detectors
is greater than the number of 1s of a specific output. This means that, that particular
entry (probability), is zero. Looking more carefully it is possible to notice some repet-
itive patterns like the repetition of a shape-like triangle of different size. Systems that
presents this kind of behavior fall under the class of fractals. This particular pattern is
called Sierpin´ski triangle. It is a fractal and attractive fixed set with the overall shape
of an equilateral triangle, subdivided recursively into smaller equilateral triangles.
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(a) 3D representation of conditioned probabilities for a system with l = 4 and n = 4
(b) Matrix representation of conditioned probabilities for a system with l = 4 and n = 4
Figure 8.11: 3D and matrix representation of all possible (Active-Inactive) configurations
and outputs for a 4 detectors system. The second image resembles the
Sierpin´ski triangle, a fractal with overall shape of an equilateral triangle,
subdivided recursively into smaller equilateral triangles.
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Originally constructed as a curve, this is an example of self-similar set, i.e. it is
a mathematically generated pattern that can be reproducible at any magnification or
reduction. The reason why the figure reproduces a fractal-like behavior is because of
an internal system’s symmetry. As previously stated, different sets produce the same
probability. For example consider the case of the output (0, 0, 0, 1) and the configurations
(I S S S), (S I S S), (S S I S) and (S S S I). Tab. (8.5) resumes the probabilities for each
configurations. The second column clearly shows that the criterions used to compute
the probabilities are the same except for a mixing of the “≥” symbol.
Output
(0, 0, 0, 1)
Configuration Probability
(I S S S) p(n1 ≥ 0 ∩ n2 = 0 ∩ n3 = 0 ∩ n4 > 0)
(S I S S) p(n1 = 0 ∩ n2 ≥ 0 ∩ n3 = 0 ∩ n4 > 0)
(S S I S) p(n1 = 0 ∩ n2 = 0 ∩ n3 ≥ 0 ∩ n4 > 0)
(S S S I) ∅
Table 8.5: Table of redundant probabilities for the output (0, 0, 0, 1). The criterions to
compute the probabilities are the same except for a mixing of the “≥” symbol.
When the fourth detector is insensitive the relative probability is zero because
the output can never be achieved.
This permits to reduce the number of configurations needed to compute every proba-
bility. The same reasoning can also be applied to the outputs. In fact, analyzing the case
(0, 0, 0, 1), a column like that of Tab. (8.5) may be attained considering the remaining
same outputs: (0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0) and (1, 0, 0, 0). Through this simplification, the new
matrix will have (l+ 1) rows and columns, and each row is present in the previous figure
(Fig. (8.11b)) exactly
(
l
s
)
times while each column
(
l
u
)
, where u is the number of 1s in
the specific output. Fig. (8.12) shows the new “matrix”. Up until now the probabilities
were calculated according to equations like Eqs. (8.8), (8.10) and (8.12).9 Looking more
closely to the system’s symmetry, it is possible to recognize a specific relation between
the rows and columns of the matrix of Fig. (8.12). In fact, each matrix’s entry, Mij,
may be computed as
Mij =
j∑
p=0
(
j
p
)
(−1)j−p(k + p)n 1
ln
where
{
0 ≤ i ≤ l
0 ≤ j ≤ l (8.13)
This definition follows directly from the fact that the numbers of repetitions of rows
and columns of the matrix in Fig. (8.11b) form a single row of the Pascal’s triangle.10
9A complete table of conditioned probabilities for all configurations and outputs for a system with
l = 2, l = 3 and generic n may be found in App. (C)
10Combining values for different l forms the Pascal’s triangle.
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Figure 8.12: Simplified matrix representation for a 4 detectors system. In the general
matrix of Fig. (8.11b) each row repeat itself exactly
(
l
s
)
times while each
column
(
l
u
)
where u is the number of 1s in the specific output.
Tab. (8.6) shows a schematic example for l = 4 while Tab. (8.7) shows the Pascal’s
triangle for l = 2, 3, . . . , 10. The bold row represents a 4 detectors system and the values
are exactly those of Tab. (8.6).
Output
(0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 1, 1) (0, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1)(
4
0
)
= 1
(
4
1
)
= 4
(
4
2
)
= 6
(
4
3
)
= 4
(
4
4
)
= 1
Table 8.6: Schematic example of how columns repetitions form a single row of the Pas-
cal’s triangle. The same relation follows even for all possible Active-Inactive
configurations.
Because the matrix of Fig. (8.12) has been made considering the system’s symmetry,
combining configurations with outputs is, somehow, similar to computing the binomial
expansion or the binomial theorem. The theorem allows to compute the algebraic ex-
pansion of powers of a binomial according to the following formula:
(x+ y)q =
q∑
r=0
(
q
r
)
xq−ryr ≡
q∑
r=0
(
q
r
)
xryq−r (8.14)
It is easily observed a close analogy between Eqs. (8.13) and (8.14).
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1, 2, 1
1, 3, 3, 1
1,4,6,4,1
1, 5, 10, 10, 5, 1
1, 6, 15, 20, 15, 6, 1
1, 7, 21, 35, 35, 21, 7, 1
1, 8, 28, 56, 70, 56, 28, 8, 1
1, 9, 36, 84, 126, 126, 84, 36, 9, 1
1, 10, 45, 120, 210, 252, 210, 120, 45, 10, 1
Table 8.7: Example of Pascal’s triangle for l = 2, 3, . . . , 10. The bold row corresponds
to a 4 detectors system.
Now, the model’s purpose is to retrieve the maximum probability for a particular con-
figuration for all outputs and use it to compute the Conditioned min-Entropy. Making
use of Eq. (8.3) it is possible to generalize its formula as follows:
Hmin(X|NT1 . . . Tl) = − log2
[
PN(0) +
∞∑
n=1
∑
t1...tl
PN(n) (D · E · F )
]
(8.15)
where

D =
(
l
s
)
E = ηs(1− η)i
F = max
x
PX|NT1...Tl(x|nt1 . . . tl)
where the variables (T1 . . . Tl) assume the values s or i according to the specific com-
bination. The binomial coefficient accounts for all repetitive configurations. It is fun-
damental, however, to stress out that each maximum probability is retrieved from a
specific Sensitive-Insensitive combination but generic output x. Fig. (8.13) shows the
Conditioned min-Entropies relative to a system with l = 3, 4, 5, . . . , 16 detectors for
varying λ values. The figure shows that for increasing number of detectors the entropy’s
maximum shifts to higher values of λ. This behavior is due to the increasing probability
of events where most of the detectors register a photon. Because the entropy reaches
its maximum when the probabilities of all possible outcomes are equal, as the number
of detectors increases it is necessary that a larger number of photons impinge on the
detectors. This way, the probability that all detectors register an event becomes equal
to all others so to increase the entropy.
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Figure 8.13: Conditioned min-Entropies relative to a system with l = 3, 4, 5, . . . , 16 de-
tectors. All of them refer to a quantum efficiency of η = 5.47 %.
8.3 Generalized model with detector noise
The model presented in Chap. (1) showed a simplified system where, except for the
quantum efficiency of the detectors, no noise effect were taken into account. In more
realistic system, there are always secondary effects that disturb a measurement. As in-
troduced in Chap. (4), the main influences found in this kind of devices are: Crosstalk,
Dark count and Afterpulses.
As in Example 2, it is possible to define a state and measurements such that the side
information corresponding to the noise is encoded in a maximum classical noise model.
Because those definitions are straightforward, it is possible to directly introduce the
random variables resulting from the model.
 Incoming photons
As for the previous model, the number of photons emitted by a source is encoded as
a random variable N with outcomes n ∈ [0, . . .∞] distributed according to a Poisson
distribution
PN(n) = e
λ λ
n
n!
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 Detector’s sensitivity
The sensitivity of the detectors corresponds to the quantum efficiency µ and is mod-
eled, for each detector R1,2,...,l, by a random variable T1,2,...,l with outcomes t1,2,...,l ∈ [0, 1].
The distribution is then
PT1,2,...,l(t1,2,...,l) = µ
s
where s corresponds to the number of sensitive detectors for a specific configuration
of t1,2,...,l.
 Noise
Dark counts, Afterpulses and Crosstalk correspond to the side information whether
a detector “clicks” independently of any incoming photons. In the same way for the
sensitivity, this too can be modeled by a random variable S1,2,...,l with outcomes s1,2,...,l ∈
[0, 1], where for s1,2,...,l = 1 corresponds to such deterministic “click”. The distribution
is then expressed as follow
PS1,2,...,l(s1,2,...,l = 1) = 1− (1− p%)(1− pγ)(1− pδ)
where p% is the Dark count probability, pγ is the Afterpulses probability and pδ is the
Crosstalk probability.
Because the joint distribution PS1,S2,...,Sl(s1, s2, . . . , sl) is in general not equal to the
product of the distributions PS1(s1)PS2(s2) . . . PSl(sl), it is necessary to compute each
conditioned probability. However, looking more closely to the system’s settings, it is
possible to recognize that the probabilities are actually the same as those of the simpler
model. In fact, the criterions used to compute them do not change. This way, after
some rearrangements, it is possible to retrieve a matrix similar to that of Fig. (8.12).
Now, for the calculation of Hmin(X|NS1S2 . . . SlT1T2 . . . Tl) it has been minimized over
all PS1S2...Sl(s1s2 . . . sl, y) subject to the constraint PS1,2,...,l(s1,2,...,l = 1) := p where y is
the free parameter (0 ≤ y ≤ p). This is the same as placing the system in the “worst
case scenario”.
The Conditioned min-Entropy is then
Hmin(X|NS1S2 . . . SlT1T2 . . . Tl) = min
y
{
− log2
[
PN (0) +
∞∑
n=1
PN (n)
( ∑
s1,2,...,l
t1,2,...,l
A ·B · C
)]}
(8.16)
where

A = PT1(t1)PT2(t2) . . . PTl(tl)
B = PS1S2...Sl(s1s2 . . . sl, y)
C = max
x
PX|S1S2...SlT1T2...Tl(x|s1s2 . . . slt1t2 . . . tl)
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Fig. (8.14) shows the new Conditioned min-Entropy for a system with l = 3, 4, 5, . . . , 16
detectors and quantum efficiency of η = 5.47 %.
Figure 8.14: Conditioned min-Entropies relative to a system with l = 3, 4, 5, . . . , 16 de-
tectors in the presence of noises (p% = 0.204, pγ = 0.0429, pδ = 9.67× 10−5).
All of them refer to a quantum efficiency of η = 5.47 %.
Making use of Eq. (8.16) and the information from Chap. (7), it is possible to extract
uniformly distributed variables conditioned on side information. Having available a
32x32 matrix of pixels from the acquisition camera, it has been subdivided the entire
frame in four smaller matrices of 256 pixels each. Figs. (8.15) and (8.16), show the
respective calculated values of λ and Hmin for each matrix subsequently printed directly
on the 32x32 frame. This kind of divisions is possible only for the LED acquisitions. For
the LED source, the photon distribution is uniform and then, the value of λ, should be
the same for each pixel of each sub-matrix. A LASER acquisition, on the contrary, has
a characteristic photon distribution so that, each pixel of each sub-matrix, is different.
This leads, then, to different values of λ (and consequently Hmin) for all four matrices.
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Figure 8.15: Division of a 32x32 frame in four sub-matrices of 256 pixels. On each
matrix is printed the respective value of λ and Hmin. The system’s quantum
efficiency is η = 41.4 % and the frame refers to a LED acquisition of working
power P = 560nW .
Figure 8.16: Division of a 32x32 frame in four sub-matrices of 256 pixels. On each
matrix is printed the respective value of λ and Hmin. The system’s quantum
efficiency is η = 41.4 % and the frame refers to a LED acquisition of working
power P = 5.269µW .
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9 Randomness extractors
The output of a generic generator shows a lack of uniformity and independence. Even if
the physical process and extraction mechanism are theoretically strong, the loss of ran-
domness is unavoidable because of the employment of not ideal electronics and devices.
The first section presents classical random extractors applied to the raw data extracted
from the system while second section shows a quantum extractors combined with the
concept of entropy discussed in Chap. (8).
9.1 Classical randomness extractors
In TRNGs is common to involve a stage of post-processing of the acquired raw data from
a physical system. Postprocessing applies mathematical functions in order to enhance
random properties of bit strings. Computer Theory develops these functions, also called
randomness extractors. The theoretical framework considers the fact that sources of
“high entropy”, i.e. sources that hold the genuine physical randomness at the origin,
produce raw bits. The usage of extractors required to compensate the loss of uniformity
and independence of bits caused by electronics that make the source “weak”. [46, 47, 48]
The first classical randomness extractor is the one developed by J. von Neumann.
Von Neumann Extractor
The Von Neumann Extractor is the most renown extractor in Computer Theory. J. von
Neumann presented this extraction method in his famous paper “Various techniques for
use in connection with random digits” in 1951. [5] The procedure applies a mapping
to each pairs of an input sequence x1, x2, . . . , xn generated by a process Xv(p) which
chooses xn from {0, 1} with independence and uniform bias. For all n bits, x1 = 1 with
probability p and xi = 0 with probability q = 1 − p, where p is unknown but fixed
(0 < p < 1). The mapping then extracts bits in the following manner:
00 → ∅
01 → 0
10 → 1
11 → ∅
Tab. (9.1) shows how the extract works for a given bit string. The method is useful
because, given p, the chance of the pair (01) is the same as that of the pair (10) since
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P (01) = qp = pq = P (10). So, using the symmetry, it is possible to produce a perfect
unbiased string without knowing the probability p.
Bit string
10001110001001110101
Von Neumann Extractor
Biased 10 00 11 10 00 10 01 11 01 01
Unbiased 1 1 1 0 0 0
Table 9.1: Representation of the Von Neumann Extractor. For a given bit string the
algorithm takes pairs of bits and produces a bit whenever they meet the
algorithm’s condition.
Von Neumann defined the efficiency of the procedure as the expected number of output
digits per input digit. For each input pair the probability of generating non-null output
digit is pq + qp = 2qp, so the efficiency is just 2qp/2 = qp, which is 1/4 when p = q = 1/2
and less elsewhere. This way, it is true that the map creates string independent of the
probability p, but the efficiency is not. Besides this fact, the implementation requires
independent bits to guarantee a true random output since, in the opposite case, the
symmetry of pairs probabilities could be compromised.
The second classical extractor widely implemented for its great efficiency is the Elias
Extractor made by Peter Elias.
Elias Extractor
P.Elias presented his extraction method in the paper The efficient construction of an
unbiased random sequence in 1927. [4] The aim of this extractor is to achieve a great
efficiency maintaining the request of independence and uniformity of a bit string. The
method is indeed simple and efficient. Given a biased N -bit long string, the system
divides the set of 2N possible input sequences into the N+1 composition classes Sk with
0 ≤ k ≤ N , containing the (N
k
)
sequences of length N which have k ones and N − k
zeros. The next step is to consider the binary expansion of
(
N
k
)
:(
N
k
)
= ξnk 2
nk + ξ(nk−1) 2
(nk−1) + · · ·+ ξ0 20
with
nk =
⌊
log2
(
N
k
)⌋
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where b·c denotes the largest integer so to ensure that ξnk , ξ(nk−1) , · · · ξ0 is the binary
expansion of
(
N
k
)
with ξnk = 1, ξj = 0 or 1 for 0 ≤ j < nk. For each non-vanishing ξj,
0 ≤ j ≤ nk, the system assigns the 2j possible output binary sequences of length j to 2j
distinct members of Sk which have not already been assigned. One member of Sk will
be assigned to no output if ξ0 = 1 so that Sk is odd. S0 and SN have only one member
each, which is therefore assigned to no output.
For a practical example, suppose that α is a random, but biased, number, β another
random number grater than α (β > α) and T = blog2 βc. If α < 2T , T bits may be
extracted; when 2T ≤ α < 2T + ξ(T−1) 2(T−1), T − 1 bits may be extracted and so on till
α = β − 1 and ξ0 = 1. In the latter no string is assigned.
The last classical extractors used in this research work is based on the work of Yuval
Peres [7] on iterating the Von Neumann extractor. In particular, M. Mitzenmacher
developed a recursive method to Peres’ system called Advanced MultiLevel Strategy
(AMLS). [6]
Advanced MultiLevel Strategy (AMLS) Extractor
The AMLS extractor comes from the essential principle of Peres’ unbiasing technique
to reiterate v. Neumann method on the discarded bits. Its efficiency lies in the use
of additional symmetries with respect to the v. Neumann one. The first symmetry is
between the case (0011) and (1100). In the original extraction scheme, no fair bits are
obtained. However, if the system produces a 0 in the first case and a 1 in the other,
the probability symmetry is still maintained (p2q2 = q2p2), while increasing the chances
of producing a fair bit (see Tab. (9.2)). A simple way to analyze this is to build a new
bit string in the following way: whenever there is a pair of bits that are the same in the
original sequence, the system introduce a new bit of that type into the new sequence and
then performs the Von Neumann Extractor. Tab. (9.3) shows the process for a given
string.
Rules Bit String
11→ 00 = 1
00→ 11 = 0
Biased 1011010000100111
Unbiased 1 0
Table 9.2: Representation of the system’s symmetry. For a given biased sequence, a new
one is generated applying the rules of the first column.
Defining B(p) a function that represents the average number of fair bits retrieved
its possible to understand how this implementation improves the number of fair bits
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Rules Bit string
11 = 1
00 = 0
Biased 1011010000100111
Numerical 1 0 0 1
Unbiased (v. N.) 1 0
Table 9.3: Representation of the AMLS Numerical procedure. A new sequence is gener-
ated applying the rules of the first column. Subsequently the system applies
the Von Neumann Extractor.
obtained from the initial bit string. A pair of same bits (00 or 11) have probabilities q2
and p2 respectively, so, on average, the system provides (p2+q2)/2 additional recursive bits
per original bit. Also, each bit at the new sequence, is 1 with probability p2/(p2+q2) and
0 with probability q2/(p2+q2). This way, B(p) becomes:
B(p) = pq +
p2 + q2
2
B
(
p2
p2 + q2
)
when p = q = 1/2, the equation gives B (1/2) = 1/4 + 1/4B (1/2)⇒ B (1/2) = 1/3.
To improve the system, the AMLS procedure implement a secondary symmetry. The
cases (1110) or (1011), produce one fair bit (v. Neumann procedure) but do not account
for the order in which these two events happen. Considering this fact, the system can
produce another fair bit thanks to the symmetry (see Tab. (9.4)). To extract the extra
bit, the method creates an additional sequence of bits again. From the original sequence,
whenever two bits are the same a 1 bit is produced while if two bits are different, a 0 is
produced. Subsequently the Von Neumann Extractor is applied to the new sequence as
well as the original one. Tab. (9.5) shows the process for a given string.
Rules Bit String{
0100
0001
= 0 Biased 1011010000100111{
1110
1011
= 1 Unbiased 1 1 0 1
Table 9.4: Representation of the system’s symmetry. For a given biased sequence, a new
one is generated applying the rules of the first column.
As done before, it is possible to determine a long-term average number of bits pro-
duced. The equation is similar to the previous case, except now for every two bits,
the system gets an additional bit in one of the derived sequences. This bit is 1 with
probability p2 + q2 since it comes up 1 whenever the pair of bits are the same.
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Rules Bit string
11 or 00 = 0
10 or 01 = 1
Biased 1011010000100111
Alphabetical 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
Unbiased (v. N.) 1 1 0 1
Table 9.5: Representation of the AMLS Alphabetical procedure. A new sequence is gen-
erated applying the rules of the first column. Subsequently the system applies
the Von Neumann Extractor.
Hence the resulting equation is:
B(p) = pq +
p2 + q2
2
B
(
p2
p2 + q2
)
+
1
2
B
(
p2 + q2
)
when p = q = 1/2, the equation gives B (1/2) = 1/4+1/4B (1/2)+1/2B (1/2)⇒ B (1/2) = 1.
Now the procedure retrieves 1 fair bit, accordingly to a perfectly uniform and inde-
pendent system. In fact, in the limit, this process extracts the maximum number of
fair bits possible for every value of p. Naturally, the first and the second procedure,
called respectively Numerical and Alphabetical, may be applied recursively to the newly
generated sequences. Tab. (9.6) shows a figurative example.
Level Bit string Von Neumann Extractor
Biased 111011001011101111100111 111110
NBias 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
N[NBias] 1 1
A[NBias] 0 1 0 0
ABias 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 01101
N[ABias] 0
A[ABias] 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
N[A [ABias]] 1 1
A[A [ABias]] 1 0 0 1
Unbiased 11110000110111
Table 9.6: Representation of a recursive implementation of the AMLS Extractor. Both
Numerical and Alphabetical procedure are applied to each new sequence re-
trieving an unbiased bit string made from the sequences elaborated with the
Von Neumann Extractor.
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9.2 Quantum randomness extractor
Differently from classical extractors, quantum extractors do not use particular complex
and difficult to predict algorithm in order to produce unbiased bit string. The potency
of a quantum approach is to exploit the very probabilistic nature of a physical process.
Chap. (1) showed how it was possible to extract a truly random output from a physical
process conditioning on all side information available to an adversary. The Conditioned
min-Entropy plays a significant role in the extraction because it is an extremely useful
tool to quantify and study intrinsic randomness of a system. The algorithm to extract
a truly random output is rather straightforward. The first step is to obtain the value of
Hmin(X|E) relative to a particular bit string and multiply it by the original bit string
length. The Quantum Leftover Hash Lemma ensures that whenever the new sequence
length l is smaller than the Conditioned min-Entropy, l < Hmin(X|E), the output of an
hash function f(x) is uniform and independent of the system E, except with probability
hash < 1. It is sufficient to choose the hash function once, using randomness that
is independent of the device. The Lemmas and definitions in Chap. (1) holds if the
hash function is extracted from the bigger family of Two-universal hashing functions.
A simple and computationally fast to implement function is the modulo. The system
determines a suitable bit length l, for a given bit string of length n, and produces a
random matrix, (l × n), cij, through which define the two-universal hashing function
Y = f(x). The extraction then continues easily performing a matrix product between
the matrix cij and the bit string Xj (j = 1, . . . n) modulo 2:
Yi =
n∑
j=1
mod2 (cijXj) (9.1)
with Yi with i = 1, 2, . . . l.
The new bit string Y is indeed truly random and independent of any “physical noise”
presents in the system. It is straightforward to see that Y is always smaller than the
original bit sequence X. This procedure uses a two-universal function that relies on an
external (and independent) source of randomness and therefore f(x) may be selected
already when manufacturing a QRNG device and hardcoded on the instrument. [20]
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10 Statistical tests
Statistical tools are essential to assess the degree of randomness of a number. These
tools belong to a distinct branch of Statistics, Hypothesis Testing, and are commonly
used in works regarding generic RNGs. The first section of the chapter presents the
concepts of test statistics, P-values and statistical distributions. The second section
shows different tests examples focusing on the tests of the NIST (National Institute of
Standard and Technology) suite. [49]
10.1 Statistical Hypothesis Testing
The model proposed in this work takes the task to study the processes that generate
random numbers and ask to consider them truly random if the outcomes are uniformly
distributed and independent of any information available in advance. Studying the bits
produced by applying a broad statistical analysis permits to judge how well the generator
fits its model. A test’s aim is to evaluate a trait of a bit sequence and show if it is likely
that an ideal generator may reproduce the same string. Another way to put it, is to say
that the test tries to see if a generator is compatible with the requirements of producing
string of bits uniform and independent. The test, of course, does not provide an actual
response of the sort yes or no, but gives a probabilistic evaluation of the hypothesis. [50]
The assumption that a bit string is random is called the null-hypothesis symbolized with
H0. A successful result from the test, or test “passed”, means that H0 is not rejected for
that string, while a failure, or test “failed” means accepting the alternative hypothesis,
H1. So, in this case, if the test passed the string is assumed random, however if the test
failed the string is not considered random. Because the number of tests is unlimited as
the number of traits, it is impossible to test a bit string exhaustively. It is commonly
recognized, however, that if different types of tests pass, the more evidences do support
the null-hypothesis H0.
Test statistic, or test variable, is a specific value that permits to link a particular trait
of a bit string to the probabilities’ framework. Let DN be the set of binary bit strings,
dN , of length N. The way a test verify the plausibility of H0 for a string dN consists in
defining a test function q which maps the strings to real numbers R:
q : DN −→ R
dN 7−→ q(dN) (10.1)
where q(dN) is the test statistic or test variable.
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As a matter of fact, q(dN) is a random variable but, if H0 holds, it follows a spe-
cific and known probability distribution. This means that if dN is truly random, the
function q produces test statistics distributed according to a particular distribution i.e.
normal, chi-square etc. , specific to the trait tested and the chosen function q. When
the particular distribution is confirmed, the statistical testing determines a critical value
to compare with the test statistics. If the test statistic value exceeds the critical value
H0 is rejected, otherwise H1 is rejected. The reason why the statistical testing works is
because the reference distribution and the critical value depend on and generate under
the unconfirmed assumption of randomness. For a given data sample, if the random-
ness assumption is indeed correct, the relative calculated test statistic will have a low
probability (e.g. 0.01%) of exceeding the critical value. Indeed, because of their random
nature, the test statistics, now referred to as X, assume possible values x that are more
or less likely to appear according to the probability distribution f (x ) associated with X.
The way a test provides this evidence consists in estimating the probability that, under
H0, the use of q on dN can return a value incompatible with x, i.e. P (X ≥ x|H0). This
probability, estimated on x and indicated as P(x), is named P-value. Its mathematical
definition is as follow:
P(x) = P (X ≥ x |H0) =
∫ ∞
x
f(x
′
) dx
′
(10.2)
Another way to express the meaning of the P-value is to consider it as the value that
summarize the strength of the evidence against the null-hypothesis. [51, 52]
Statistical hypothesis testing provides a two possible outcome systems: accept H0 or
H1. Tab. (10.1) shows the potential conclusions of the analysis given the exact status
of the given data.
SITUATION
CONCLUSION
Accept H0 Accept H1
Data random (H0 is true) No error Type I error
Data not random (H1 is true) Type II error No error
Table 10.1: Representation of the possible results after applying a statistical hypothesis
testing to a given data set.
Looking at Tab. (10.1) there are some combinations that provide two different type of
errors. The Type I error corresponds to the event where the null-hypothesis is rejected,
even though the data is truly random. The Type II error instead is when the null-
hypothesis is accepted, even though, the data is not random. The probability of Type I
error is usually called the level of significance of the test and denoted as α.
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This parameter then indicates the probability that a bit string is not considered ran-
dom when it really is. The probability of Type II error instead is called β and, unlike α,
does not have a fixed value. This is because there are an infinite number of ways that a
bit string may be “non-random” and each of them yields a different β. It is desirable,
of course, to minimize the probability of this error, and that is achieved by pre-selecting
the sample size n of the data and the value α because α, β and n, are strictly related
to each other so that knowing two of them automatically determine the other. Thanks
to this relation, after applying the test statistic for a sample size n and a value for α,
a critical value is selected so to produce the smallest β possible. These two types of
error may be expressed in terms of conditioned probability. Using the same notation as
Eq. (10.2), and denoting c the critical value, the Type I and II error becomes:
P (X > c |H0 is true) = P (rejectH0 |H0 is true) Type I error
P (X ≤ c |H0 is false) = P (acceptH0 |H0 is false) Type II error
In view of the above explanation, the definition of the P-value should be restated
as follow: the P-value is the probability that a perfect RNG would have produced a
sequence less random than the one that is being tested. If a P-value is equal to 1, then
the bit string appears to have “perfect randomness”. If it is equal to 0, instead, the
string appears to be absolutely not random. The limit value of P-value that defines if a
string should be considered random is the α parameter itself. If P-value ≥ α, then the
null-hypothesis is accepted, i.e. the bit string “appears” to be random. Otherwise, if
P-value < α, the alternative hypothesis is accepted and the string “appears” to be non-
random. The verb “appear” has been used because of the statistical and probabilistic
nature of the Hypothesis Testing. In cryptography, ordinary values of α lie in the range
[0.001, 0.01] corresponding to a confidence level of 99.9 % and 99 % respectively.
As stated above, test statistics follow a specific and known statistical distribution
according to the chosen test function and the validity of the randomness assumption.
There are two principal distributions that most of the test statistics follow: the standard
normal distribution and the chi-square distribution, or equivalently χ2.
Normal distribution:
A random variable X follows the normal distribution N (µ, σ2) with mean µ and
variance σ2 if its probability density function is given by
f(x) =
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
[
−(x− µ)
2
2σ2
]
(10.3)
If the test statistic X is normally distributed then the closer the value x is to µ, the
“better” random traits the bit string has. Measuring by how much the test statistic
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deviates from the expected value µ, the test quantifies the evidence of no-randomness
of the bit string. Given the symmetric profile of the distribution both x > µ and x < µ
provide the same probabilities and the P-value is:
P(x) = P (X > |x| ) = 2P (X > x) = 2
∫ ∞
x
f(x
′
) dx
′ −∞ < x <∞
where this type of test is called a two tails test.
For a practical example, setting a level of significance of 1% and using a standard normal
distribution N (0, 1), all test statistics with x ≥ |2.576| are rejected since
2
∫ ∞
2.576
f(x) dx = 0.01
Chi-Square or χ2 distribution
A variable X follows a chi-square distribution with d degrees of freedom, mean µ = d
and variance σ2 = 2d, if its probability density function is
f(x) =
1
Γ(d/2) 2d/2
x
d/2−1 exp
[
−x
2
]
0 ≤ x <∞ (10.4)
The system usually performs a one tail test with a level of significance set only at the
rightmost side of the distribution. This way, a bit string appears to be not random if
the test statistic value is far away from the mean value.
10.2 RNG Tests
There exist many different statistical tests available to verify a bit string randomness.
Most of them are contained in various Testing Suite freely accessible online. A suite is
a collection of tests specifically developed by scientific institution or researchers in the
field of RNGs and cryptography. Depending on the purpose of the analysis made on the
system, even suites may be subdivided into two main branches: the cryptography and
the statistical branch. The first applies a “bit-approach” considering the bit string as a
sequence of 0s and 1s, while the latter applies a “number-approach” studying the quali-
ties of numbers extracted from the same string taking more bits at a time (usually 32).
This research project focuses on the randomness analysis especially for cryptographic
purpose and so it was decided to perform statistical tests by the usage of the NIST suite.
The Statistical Test Suite developed by the American National Institute of Standard
and Technology (NIST) applies stringent tests in order to validate the reliability of
PRNGs and TRNGs (in which QRNGs appear) for cryptographic applications. The suite
is widely used and thus counted as a standard. Tab. (10.2) shows the tests implemented
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in the suite. Test statistics retrieved from the suite follow the normal and chi-square
distributions. The test statistic for the normal distribution is of the form
z =
x− µ
σ
where x is the sample test statistic, µ and σ2 are the expected value and variance
of the test statistic respectively. The chi-square distribution (i.e. a left-skewed curve)
compares the goodness-of-fit of the observed frequencies of a sample measure to the
corresponding expected frequencies of the hypothesized distribution. The test statistic
is of the form:
χ2 =
∑ (oi − ei)2
ei
where oi and ei are the observed and expected frequencies of occurrence of the measure
respectively.
Statistical Test Suite NIST
Nr. Test
1 Frequency (Monobit)
2 Frequency within a Block
3 The Runs
4 Longest-Run-of-Ones in a Block
5 Binary Matrix Rank
6 Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral)
7 Non-overlapping Template Matching
8 Overlapping Template Matching
9 Maurer’s “Universal Statistical”
10 Linear Complexity
11 Serial
12 Approximate Entropy
13 Cumulative Sums (Cusums)
14 Random Excursions
15 Random Excurions Variant
Table 10.2: List of tests implemented in the NIST suite.
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When applying the NIST suite, the developers specify that the size of a sequence length
must be large (of the order of 103 to 107) [53, 54, 55, 56] so to justify the derivation
of the asymptotic reference distributions. Most of the test are still applicable for a
smaller sequence length, but the asymptotic reference distributions would be unsuitable
and would have to be replaced by the exact distributions commonly hard to calculate.
The following list analyzes each single test and explains what its purpose is and how
it retrieves the P-value.1 The mathematical functions employed for the computation of
the P-value are summarize in App. (B). All the tests refer to a bit string of length n.
1. Frequency (Monobit) Test
The purpose of this test is to determine whether the number of ones and zeros in a
sequence is approximately the same as expected for a truly random sequence. [57] All
subsequent tests depend on the passing of this test. The reference distribution for the
test statistic is half normal (for large n). If the sequence is random, then the plus and
minus ones will tend to cancel one another out so that the test statistic will be about
0. If there are too many ones or too many zeroes, then the test statistic will tend to be
larger than zero. The P-value is computed as follow:
P-value = erfc
(
sobs√
2
)
where erfc is the complementary error function and sobs is the observed test statistic.
2. Frequency within a Block Test
The purpose of this test to determine whether the frequency of ones in an M -bit block
is approximately M/2 as would be expected under an assumption of randomness. [58] For
block size M = 1, the test degenerates to the Frequency (Monobit) test. The reference
distribution for the test statistic is a chi-square distribution. The P-value is computed
as follow:
P-value = igamc
(
N
2
,
χ2(obs)
2
)
where igamc is the incomplete gamma function, N is the number of M-bit blocks
and χ2(obs) is the observed chi-square statistic. The latter is a measure of how well the
observed proportion of ones within a given M-bit block match the expected proportion
(1/2).
1The description of each test is taken from the “NIST Special Publication 800-22rev1a”
from the internet website: http: // csrc. nist. gov/ groups/ ST/ toolkit/ rng/ documentation_
software. html .
97
CHAPTER 10. STATISTICAL TESTS
The parameter is computed as follow:
χ2(obs) = 4M
N∑
i=1
(pii − 1/2)2
where pii is the proportion of ones in the ith block retrieved from the formula
pii =
1
M
M∑
j=1
ε(i−1)M+j for 1 ≤ i ≤ N
where εk is the kth element of the bit string.
3. Runs Test
The focus of this test is the total number of runs in the sequence, where a run is an
uninterrupted sequence of identical bits. A run of length k consists of exactly k identical
bits, bounded before and after with a bit of the opposite value. The purpose of the runs
test is to determine whether the number of runs of ones and zeros of various lengths is
as expected for a random sequence. [59] In particular, this test determines whether the
oscillation between such zeros and ones is too fast or too slow. This test also performs
the P-value using the erfc function:
P-value = erfc
( |Vn(obs)− 2npi(1− pi)|
2
√
2npi(1− pi)
)
where pi is the proportion of ones in the entire bit string and Vn(obs) is the observed
test statistic
Vn(obs)
n−1∑
k=1
r(k) + 1
where r(k) = 0 if εk = εk+1 and r(k) = 1 otherwise.
4. Longest Run of Ones in a Block Test
The purpose of this test is to determine whether the length of the longest run of ones
within the tested sequence is consistent with the length of the longest run of ones that
would be expected in a random sequence. An irregularity in the expected length of the
longest run of ones implies that there is also a deviation in the expected length of the
longest run of zeroes. For this reason, only a test for ones is necessary. [60] The reference
distribution for the test statistics is a chi-square distribution, where the test statistic
value itself is computed as follow:
χ2(obs) =
K∑
i=0
(νi −Npii)2
Npii
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where the program provides the values for pii as for the values of the parameters K
and N. νi is the frequency of the longest runs of ones in the ith block retrieved according
to a particular algorithm implemented in the suite. As for some of the previous tests,
the function igamc retrieves the P-value:
P-value = igamc
(
K
2
,
χ2(obs)
2
)
5. Binary Matrix Rank Test
The focus of the test is the rank of disjoint sub-matrices of the entire sequence. The
purpose of this test is to check for linear dependence among fixed length substrings of
the original sequence. This test also appears in the DIEHARD battery of tests [61]. The
original bit sequence is divided into M ·Q-bit disjoint blocks and subsequently computed
their binary ranks, Rl with l = 1, . . . , N . Defining Fm, FM−1 and N − FM − FM−1
respectively as the number of matrices with rank Rl = M , Rl = M − 1 and Rl =
number of matrices remaining, the test statistic becomes:
χ2(obs) =
(FM − 0.288N)2
0.288N
+
(FM−1 − 0.5776N)2
0.5776N
+
(N − FM − FM−1 − 0.1336N)2
0.1336N
The corresponding P-value then is:
P-value = igamc
(
1 ,
χ2(obs)
2
)
6. Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test
The focus of this test is the peak heights in the Discrete Fourier Transform of the
sequence. The purpose of this test is to detect periodic features (i.e., repetitive patterns
that are near each other) in the tested sequence that would indicate a deviation from
the assumption of randomness. The intention is to detect whether the number of peaks
exceeding the 95% threshold is significantly different than 5%. [62] Applying a Discrete
Fourier Transform (DFT) on the bit string produce a sequence of complex variables that
represents periodic components found in the sample data. The test then uses a modulo
function on the first n/2 elements producing a sequence of peak heights. These values
are confronted with the 95% peak height threshold value T defined as
T =
√
log
(
1
0.05
)
n
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The test statistic d which is the normalized difference between the observed and the
expected number of frequency components that are beyond the 95% threshold follow a
normal distribution and is defined as follow:
d =
√
4(N1 −N0)√
n · 0.95 · 0.05
The corresponding P-value is:
P-value = erfc
( |d|√
2
)
7. Non Overlapping Template Matching Test
The purpose of this test is to detect generators that produce too many occurrences of
a given non-periodic (aperiodic) pattern. For this test and the Overlapping Template
Matching Test, an m-bit window is used to search for a specific m-bit pattern. If the
pattern is not found, the window slides one bit position. If the pattern is indeed found,
the window is reset to the bit after the observed pattern, and the search resumes. [63]
The test subdivides the bit string in N smaller string of length M and then determines
the values Wj as the number of times that a template B occurs within the j th block. The
template B is an m-bit string of zeros and ones that is defined in a template library of
non-periodic patterns contained within the suite. Under an assumption of randomness,
the theoretical mean µ and variance σ2 are:
µ =
M −m+ 1
2m
σ2 = M
(
1
2m
− 2m− 1
22m
)
The test statistic follows a chi-square distribution
χ2(obs) =
N∑
j=1
(Wj − µ)2
σ2
and, as the previous tests, gives a P-value:
P-value = igamc
(
N
2
,
χ2(obs)
2
)
It is important to stress out that the test computes a P-value for each template
providing up to 148 and 284 P-values for m = 9 and m = 10 respectively.2
2The test code has been written to provide templates with m = 10 at maximum.
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8. Overlapping Template Matching Test
The focus of the Overlapping Template Matching Test is the number of occurrences of
pre-specified target strings. As for the Non Overlapping Template Matching Test, this
test also uses an m-bit window to search for a particular pattern. [64] If the pattern is
not found, the window slides one bit position. The difference between this test and the
previous one is that, when the pattern is found, the window slides only one bit before
resuming the search. Analogously to the Non Overlapping Test, this one computes two
parameters, λ and η, later used to determine the theoretical probabilities pii according
to a predefined algorithm within the suite. These parameters are defined as follow:
λ =
(M −m+ 1)
2m
η =
λ
2
Even in this case, the test statistic follow a chi-square distribution
χ2(obs) =
5∑
i=0
(νi −Npii)2
Npii
where
pi0 = 0.364091
pi1 = 0.185659
pi2 = 0.139381
pi3 = 0.100571
pi4 = 0.070432
pi5 = 0.139865
The P-value is then retrieved:
P-value = igamc
(
5
2
,
χ2(obs)
2
)
9. Maurer’s “Universal Statistical” Test
The purpose of the test is to detect whether or not a bit sequence may be significantly
compressed without loss of information. An evident compressible sequence is considered
to be non-random. [50, 65, 66] The test partitions the n-bit sample in two subsets: an
initialization segment consisting of Q · L-bit non overlapping blocks and a test segment
consisting of K · L-bit non overlapping blocks. The remaining bits at the end that do
not form a complete L-bit block are discarded. The recommended values for L lies in
the region 6 ≤ L ≤ 16. Through the usage of a sophisticated algorithm, the test creates
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a table, T, of the decimal representation of the contents of each L-bit block and then
computes the following test statistic:
fn =
1
K
Q+K∑
i=Q+1
log2(i− Tj)
where Tj is the j th entry of the table T. fn is the sum of the log2 distances between
matching L-bit templates, i.e. the sum of the number of digits in the distance between
L-bit templates. As for the Frequency Test, the test statistic follows a half normal
distribution. The P-value then is retrieved using the erfc function:
P-value = erfc
(∣∣∣∣∣fn − µ(L)√ϑ(L)
∣∣∣∣∣
)
where µ(L) and σ(L) take values from a table of precomputed values.3 Under an
assumption of randomness, the sample mean, µ(L), is the theoretical expected value of
the computed statistic for the given L-bit length. The theoretical standard deviation is
given by
σ = c
√
ϑ(L)
K
where
c = 0.7− 0.8
L
+
(
4 +
32
L
)
K−3L
15
10. Linear Complexity Test
The purpose of this test is to determine whether or not a sequence is complex enough
to be considered random. Random sequences are characterized by long LFSRs (Linear
Feedback Shift Register). An LFSR that is too short implies non-randomness. The test
splits the n-bit sequence in N independent blocks of M bits. It then uses the Berlekamp-
Massey algorithm determining the linear complexity Li of each of the N blocks. [67]
Li is the length of the shortest linear feedback shift register sequence that generates all
bits in the block i. Within any Li-bit sequence, some combination of the bits, when
added together modulo 2, produces the next bit in the sequence (bit Li + 1). Under an
assumption of randomness, the theoretical mean µ is:
µ =
M
2
+
(
9 + (−1)M+1)
36
− 1
9
(3M + 2)
2M
3The values are taken from the “Handbook of Applied Cryptography”.
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In the next step, the test compute the value Ti:
Ti = (−1)M (Li − µ) + 2
9
According to a specific criterion, if the ith value of T is between a set of predefined
boundaries, the system increments a counter νj with j = 1, . . . , 6. The test statistic
follows a chi-square distribution:
χ2(obs) =
K∑
i=0
(νi −Npii)2
Npii
where the pii, as for those of the Overlapping Template Matching Test, are extracted
according to a predefined function and K is the number of degrees of freedom.4 The
P-value is then computed:
P-value = igamc
(
K
2
,
χ2(obs)
2
)
11. Serial Test
The purpose of this test is to determine whether the number of occurrences of the
2m m-bit overlapping patterns is approximately the same as expected for a random
sequence. Random sequences have uniformity; that is, every m-bit pattern has the same
chance of appearing as every other m-bit pattern. [68] For m = 1, the Serial Test is
equivalent to the Frequency Test. The test first extend the original bit sequence by
appending the first m-1 bits to its end, where m is the length in bits of each block. It
then determines the frequencies, νi1 . . . νim , of all possible overlapping m-bit blocks of the
m-bit patterns i1 . . . im. The same procedure is performed to the (m-1) and (m-2)-bit
pattern. The next step is to compute the respective ψ2m, ψ
2
m−1 and ψ
2
m−2 functions:
ψ2m =
2m
n
∑
i1...im
ν2i1...im − n
ψ2m−1 =
2m−1
n
∑
i1...im−1
ν2i1...im−1 − n
ψ2m−2 =
2m−2
n
∑
i1...im−2
ν2i1...im−2 − n
4The value K = 6 has been hard coded into the test.
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The test statistics, which follow a chi-square distribution, are then computed as:
∇ψ2m = ψ2m − ψ2m−1
∇2ψ2m = ψ2m − 2ψ2m−1 + ψ2m−2
and the corresponding P-values :
P-value1 = igamc
(
2m−2 ,∇ψ2m
)
P-value2 = igamc
(
2m−3 ,∇2ψ2m
)
12. Approximate Entropy Test
The purpose of the test is to compare the frequency of overlapping blocks of two
consecutive/adjacent lengths (m and m+1) against the expected result for a random
sequence. [69] The test performs the same first steps of the algorithm of the Serial Test
to a bit string of length n. The system then counts all the possible m-bit, (m+1)-bit,
values and represents them as C mi , where i is the m-bit value:
C mi =
# i
n
The test then computes the functions φ(m) and φ(m+1) to extract the test statistic:
φ(m) =
2m−1∑
i=0
C
(m)
i log2C
(m)
i
φ(m+1) =
2m+1−1∑
i=0
C
(m+1)
i log2C
(m+1)
i
χ2(obs) = 2n [log2 − ApEn(m)]
where
ApEn(m) = φ(m) − φ(m+1)
The P-value thus is:
P-value = igamc
(
2m−1 ,
χ2(obs)
2
)
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13. Cumulative Sums (Cusum) Test
The purpose of the test is to determine whether the cumulative sum of the partial
sequences occurring in the tested sequence is too large or too small relative to the
expected behavior of that cumulative sum for random sequences. The cumulative sum
may be considered as a random walk. [60] For a random sequence, the excursions of
the random walk should be near zero. For certain types of non-random sequences, the
excursions of this random walk from zero will be large. The test converts the zeros
and ones of the input sequence into -1 and +1 respectively. The system then computes
partial sums Si of successively larger subsequences starting from the first value (mode
0 ) or last value (mode 1 ).
{
Sk = Sk−1 +Xk for mode 0
Sk = Sk−1 +Xn−k+1 for mode 1
whereXk identifies the kth element of the converted bit string. The test then computes
the test statistic as
z = max
1≤k≤n
|Sk|
where max1≤k≤n |Sk| is the largest of the absolute values of the partial sums Sk. This
variable follows a normal distribution and the corresponding P-value is:
P-value = 1 −
4(n−zz )∑
k=4(−n+zz )
[
Φ
(
(4k + 1)z√
n
)
− Φ
(
(4k − 1)z√
n
)]
+
4(n−zz )∑
k=4(−n−3zz )
[
Φ
(
(4k + 3)z√
n
)
− Φ
(
(4k + 1)z√
n
)]
where Φ is the Standard Normal Cumulative Probability Distribution Function.
14. Random Excursions Test
The focus of this test is the number of cycles having exactly K visits in a cumulative
sum random walk. The cumulative sum random walk derives from partial sums after the
(0, 1) sequence is transferred to the appropriate (−1,+1) sequence. A cycle of a random
walk consists of a sequence of steps of unit length taken at random that begins at and
return to the origin. The purpose of this test is to determine if the number of visits
to a particular state within a cycle deviates from what one would expect for a random
sequence. [70] This test is actually a series of eight tests (and conclusions), one test and
conclusion for each of the states: (x = −4,−3,−2,−1) and (x = +1,+2,+3,+4). The
test computes the partial sums Si of successively larger sequences of the n-bit string and
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uses their values to initialize a new one, S
′
, adding a zero before and after the set of
values. The test then computes a test statistic for each value of x :
χ2(obs) =
5∑
k=0
(νk(x)− Jpik(x))2
Jpik(x)
where pik(x) is the probability that the state x occurs k times in a random distribution
calculated according to predefined functions. νk(x) is the total number of cycles in which
state x occurs exactly k times among all cycles, for k = 0, 1, . . . , 5 (k = 5 counts also
all frequencies ≥ 5). J is the total number of zeros crossings in the new string S ′ and
it is also the number of cycles in S
′
, where a cycle is a subsequence consisting of an
occurrence of zero, followed by no-zero values, and ending with another zero. For each
x the P-value is:
P-value = igamc
(
5
2
,
χ2(obs)
2
)
15. Random Excursions Variant Test
The purpose of this test is to detect deviations from the expected number of visits to
various states in the random walk. [71] This test is actually a series of eighteen tests
(and conclusions), one for each of the states: −9,−8, . . . ,−1 and +1,+2, . . . ,+9. The
test proceeds in the same way of the Cumulative Sums and then, after obtaining the
string S
′
, computes the test statistic ξ(x) for each of the eighteen non-zero states of x.
ξ(x) is the total number of times that the state x occurred across all J cycles. Because
the test statistics follows an half normal distribution, the x th P-value is computed as:
P-value = erfc
(
|ξ(x)− J |√
2J(|x| − 2)
)
The NIST suite is, of course, not the only existing testing suite. In the world of crypto-
graphic suite there exists three more “standard” suites: the AIS31, the DIEHARD and
the TESTU01. The AIS31 is a cryptographic suite developed by the German Bundesamt
fu¨r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (Federal Office for Security in Informa-
tion Technology) on the theoretical work made by W. Schindler in order to define a
reliable method for the evaluation of TRNGs. [72, 73] The tests described by Schindler
are divided into two classes: the first class checks that the random bits do not present
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conspicuous statistical traits while the second class verifies that they are practically im-
possible to determine even if the predecessors or successors are known. The DIEHARD
battery includes tests developed to test PRNGs and represent a standard due to the
difficulty generators have of passing them. The DIEHARD suite is also used for TRNGs
[74, 75, 76], but that could be attributed more to its fame rather than the suitability of
the tests to reveal weakness introduced by hardware problems. The TESTU01 is a li-
brary of tests developed by L’Ecuyer [77, 78]. The suite is the most recent and comprises
the largest spectrum of tests presently available. As for the DIEHARD suite, most of its
tests are oriented for the analysis of PRNGs, but the suite provides a specific battery,
the Alphabit battery, designed primarily to test hardware random bits generators. This
battery directly analyzes bits and applies tests sensitive to the typical problems of bit
uniformity and independence.
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11 Tests results
Test statistics provide information about the degree of randomness of a number. Nor-
mally, the P-values associated to these values, are analyze in order to asses, with suffi-
cient confidence, if the bit string may be considered random. Two specific studies permit
to decide if the test statistics really satisfy the null-hypothesis : uniformity of P-values
and threshold limit for the sub-strings proportion. The first section shows the results
obtained from strings generated by classical extractors while the second section shows
the results from the quantum extractor.
11.1 Classical testing results
The NIST suite, after the application of the tests, prints a detailed report, for every test,
of the distribution of P-values calculated for every sub-string, the P-value on the uniform
distribution of the P-values and the proportion of bit strings that passed the test. A
test is failed if: the proportion of sub-strings is below a given threshold calculated on the
basis of the number of strings analyzed or if the distribution of P-values is not uniform.
Starting with the first criterion, it is simpler to understand the process considering the
following example. Suppose that the bit string analyzed is subdivided in m = 1000
sub-strings. The significance level α gives the number of strings expected to fail the test
(for α = 0.01 it means that 1 string, out of 100, is expected to fail the test). Out of
all the m sub-strings, suppose that 996 passed the test, that is P-values ≥ α, then the
proportion is 996/1000 = 0.996. The upper and lower threshold, that specify the range of
acceptable proportions, are determined as:
pˆ± 3
√
pˆ(1− pˆ)
m
(11.1)
where pˆ = 1− α and m is the sample size.
These levels arise from the normal approximation of the binomial distribution. If the
sample size m is such that n (1−α) > 5 and αm > 5, then the expected number of strings
with a P-value larger than α is m (1−α) with standard deviation σ = √α (1− α)m. [79,
80] The expected proportion then may be lowered by the right hand side of Eq. (11.1).
Fig. (11.1) shows the plot of proportion relative to the tests performed on a bit string
extracted from raw data. Fig. (11.3) represents the result of the analysis made on a
100Mb file obtained by applying the Elias Extractor while Fig. (11.4) display the results
of a 100Mb file obtained by applying the AMLS Extractor. The red lines represents the
upper and lower threshold computed following Eq. (11.1). Looking at the plot of the
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raw data, it is clear that the system is heavily biased. Because of the implementation of
inefficient devices, the system produce more 0s than 1s, offsetting the entire bit string.
Figure 11.1: Proportion plot relative to a 20Mb file of raw data directly extracted from
the acquisition frames. Only the Rank and Linear Complexity tests passed.
Figure 11.2: Byte distribution for the raw data file showing an evident repetitive pattern.
The dashed red line represents the constant value of 1/256, corresponding to
a perfectly uniform distribution.
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A second way to assess the impossibility of using numbers extracted from this type
of bit sequences is to examine the bytes distribution. If the bit string is indeed ran-
dom, the possible byte outputs (8-bit sequence corresponding to unsigned integer values
{0, . . . , 255}) are uniformly distributed. Any evident deviation from the expected behav-
ior is an indicator of no randomness. Fig. (11.2) shows the bytes distribution for the raw
data file. As shown in the graphic, the distribution is far from uniform. There is a clear
repetitive pattern symptom of more frequent identical bytes in the bit sequence. This
is an obvious example of why it is necessary to implement a stage of post processing in
a TRNG. Figs. (11.3) and (11.4) instead, show that the tests passing the first condition
for asserting that the bit string is truly random are practically all of them.
Figure 11.3: Proportion plot relative to a 100Mb file obtained by applying the Elias
Extractor to a LASER acquisition at working power of 1.24µW . Only one
point exceeds the lower threshold, but to ascertain that the test did not
pass, it is necessary to examine the relative P-values distribution.
Indeed, there are very few tests (two for the temporal AMLS and only one for the
Elias) that did not meet the passing condition, but it is important to stress out that
its the second criterion that more strongly rules the passing of a test. In fact, if the
P-values distribution is not uniform, then this is a strong indicator that the analyzed bit
string does not present randomness properties even if the relative proportion is inside
the acceptance range (red lines). [81, 82] This way, it is necessary to study the P-values
distribution for each test. A simple solution to how illustrate the analysis is to use an
histogram plot. The interval [0,1], that is the range of possible P-values, is divided
into 10 sub-intervals, and the P-values that lie within each sub-interval are counted and
displayed.
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(a) Results relative to a file extracted via the spatial method for a LED
acquisition of 1.24µW
(b) Results relative to a file extracted via the temporal method for a LASER
acquisition at working power of 7.46µW
Figure 11.4: Proportion plots relative to a 100Mb files obtained by applying the AMLS
Extractor to a bit string retrieved via the spatial and temporal method for
a LED acquisition at working power of 1.24µW and a LASER acquisition
at working power of 7.46µW . There are only two points outside the lower
threshold, but to ascertain that both tests did not pass, it is necessary to
examine the relative P-values distribution.
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Naturally there is the need to mathematically, and not just figuratively, assert that
the distribution is indeed uniform. To do that a chi-square test is made, extracting
P-valueT , corresponding to the Goodness of Fit Distributional Test on the P-values
obtained for an arbitrary statistical test, i.e. a P-value of the P-values. [83, 84]
This is accomplished by computing:
χ2 =
10∑
i=1
(Fi − S/10)2
S/10
where Fi is the number of P-values in sub-interval i and S is the sample size. The
P-valueT is then calculated as:
P-valueT = igamc
(
9
2
,
χ2
2
)
If P-valueT ≥ 10−4, then the sequence may be considered to be uniformly distributed.
Additionally, to provide statistically meaningful results at least 55 sequences must be
processed. [49] To verify that, the three test that in Figs. (11.3) and (11.4) did not pass
the first criterion are in reality just statistical fluctuations, it has been computed the
respective P-valueT of their P-values. Fig. (11.5) shows the histograms of the P-values
distributions while Tab. (11.1) shows the P-valuesT . Looking at the table’s entries, all
of them satisfy the condition P-valueT ≥ 10−4. This proves that the reason why the
three tests did not pass the proportion criterion was because of statistical fluctuations.
This is perfectly normal and common in statistical testing because of its statistic nature.
Files P-valueT
“Elias” 0.122
“AMLS”
0.159
0.532
Table 11.1: P-valuesT of the three data proportions that do not satisfy the passing con-
dition of Eq. (11.1). The entries for the “AMLS” file are relative to the tem-
poral method extraction. All of them satisfy the condition P-valueT ≥ 10−4
confirming that the reason for not passing the proportion test was due to
statistical fluctuations.
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(a) P-values distribution for the “Elias” file relative to the test that did not
pass the proportion criterion
(b) P-values distributions for the “AMLS” file relative to the tests that did
not pass the proportion criterion
Figure 11.5: P-values distributions for all three tests that did not pass the proportion
criterion. The distributions do not provide a direct visual proof if they
are uniform or not. However, looking at Tab (11.1) entries, the chi-square
analysis verifies that they are indeed uniform and then confirming that the
system presents statistical fluctuations.
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(a) Byte distribution for the “Elias” file
(b) Byte distribution for the “AMLS” file
Figure 11.6: Bytes distributions relative to the “Elias” and “AMLS” files. The frequency
with which every byte is present in the original bit sequence is normalized
so that the expected value is fM = 0.0039 = 1/256. The red dashed lines
represent this value.
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As previously stated, normal hardware and software implementation require the usage
of random numbers instead of bit strings. Performing a byte (8-bit long sequence)
distribution on a given bit string permits to assert if the sequence is indeed random.
Contrarily to the byte distribution shown in Fig. (11.2), this time it is expected that
all the possible values {0, . . . , 255} that a byte may produce, are uniformly distributed.
Fig. (11.6) shows the bytes distributions for the “Elias” and “AMLS” files. Looking at
these histograms it is clear that the distributions are perfectly uniform. The normalized
frequency at which every byte is present in the bit string is exactly fM = 0.0039 = 1/256
represented with a red dashed line in the plots.
11.2 Quantum testing results
The application of the quantum extractor yields bit strings that are really small com-
pared to the raw data. This is because the value of the Hmin(x|E) for a given number
of detectors is always less than the number of extractable bit sequence. For example,
consider the case of three detectors and a value of λ that maximize the Conditioned
min-Entropy for a quantum efficiency of η = 5.47%. According to Fig. (8.13) the cor-
responding value is Hmin = 0.0690. This means that, selecting only 0.0690 bits out of
a 4-bit sequence, provides a truly random sequence conditioned on all side information.
Because of this low “bit-rate” extraction, the implemented program used to obtained
the sequences glues together more strings in order to retrieve a sufficiently longer one to
test. Fig. (11.7) shows the tests proportions for a 100Mb file. This time the proportions
are distributed more closely to the expected value pˆ symptom that more strings passed
the statistical testing. Naturally to fully consider passed all the tests, it is necessary to
control the P-values distribution and check if they are uniformly distributed. Fig. (11.8)
shows the distribution. Computing the chi-square test gives χ2 = 0.0577 that produces
P-valueT = 1.00. Because P-valueT is greater than 10−4, the sequence can be considered
uniformly distributed. The fact that the P-valueT is one is mostly because the programs
rounds values up to the hundredth digit and not because of the extremely degree of uni-
formity. Even if that is the case, this proves that a bit sequence extracted via quantum
approach is (almost) perfectly random. Fig. (11.9) shows the bytes distribution relative
to the 100Mb file.
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Figure 11.7: Proportion plots relative to a 100Mb files obtained by applying the Quan-
tum Extractor to a bit string retrieved from a LASER acquisition at working
power of 1.15µW . The points are distributed closely to the expected value
pˆ = 0.99 meaning that more sub-strings passed the tests.
Figure 11.8: P-values distribution for all tests applied to the bit sequence extracted
via the Quantum Extractor. The χ2 test on the distribution produces an
extreme P-valueT : P-valueT = 1.
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Figure 11.9: Byte distribution relative to a LASER acquisition at working power of
1.15µW after applying the Quantum Extractor. The frequency with which
every byte is present in the original bit sequence is normalized so that the
expected value is fM = 0.0039 = 1/256. The red dashed lines represent this
value.
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Conclusions
The thesis focuses on the generation of truly random numbers from quantum physi-
cal processes, QRNGs (Quantum Random Number Generators), in this case the PBS
model, through the usage of particular post-processing. A light source (LASER and
LED) emits photon that impinge on a camera made of 32x32 SPADs (Single Photon
Avalanche Diodes) with a “single photon” sensitivity. The signal is then digitalized and
sent to the computer through a USB cable directly connected to the camera. Different
acquisitions were made varying the working power of the light sources and the relative
distance between the camera and the sources themselves.
The theoretical model developed by D. Frauchiger, R. Renner and M. Troyer “True
randomness from realistic quantum devices” [20], permits to apply a sophisticated post-
processing capable of extracting true random bits even from heavily biased random
sources. Instead of concentrating on the actual random number, the model studies the
physical process that produces the number.
Exploiting the spatial chaos of photons detection by the camera, the simpler model
of [20] was expanded to a general one with an indefinite number of detectors. General-
izing the multinomial distribution (rising from the calculus of all possible outputs for a
given set of detectors) allows to perform fractals, binomial expansions, and probabilities
analysis. For a more realistic physical system, Dark count, Crosstalk and Afterpulsing
effects were taken into account.
The thesis studies in parallel PRNGs (Pseudo Random Number Generators) using
sophisticated algorithms. The main difference between QRNGs and PRNGs is that the
first exploit the very probabilistic and aleatory nature of quantum processes while the
latter uses mathematical approaches that are fated to produce the same numbers after
a specific time. The work focuses on three principal, and most sophisticated, extractors:
Von Neumann, Elias and AMLS (Advance MultiLevel Strategy) (The Von Neumann
extractor is not sophisticated, but it is one of the most famous).
Statistical tests permit to verify randomness and statistically ensure that numbers
are actually random. Both classical and quantum extracted numbers pass these tests
guaranteeing the requests of uniformity and independence.
Cameras made of 32x32 arrays of SPADs are expensive and thus are not always af-
fordable. The model, however, permits to reduce the number of required pixels to the
one desired and still produce truly random numbers. This way it is possible to make
use of less refined and complex cameras.
As for all QRNGs that relies on “PBS models”, even this one does not permit to
obtain a fast generation rate (in this case 48 Mbit/s). Nonetheless, the post-processing
ensures that the random numbers are truly random.
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A Coherent states
The most commonly “single mode” state does not correspond to an individual “number
state” |n〉, but to a linear superposition of them. There exist many different kinds of
superposition states, but the most important and of practical use is the “coherent state”.
This state plays a significant role in the quantum theory of light. The coherent states
take the Greek letter |α〉. The corresponding electric field variation approximates that
of the classical wave of stable amplitude ad fixed phase in the limit of high excitation.
Their importance does not only dwell on the fact that their properties most closely re-
semble those of a classical electromagnetic wave, but also because a single mode LASER
operated above threshold generates a coherent state excitation. In general terms, a
coherent state is expressed as following:
|α〉 = e−|α|2/2
∞∑
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉 (A.1)
In Eq. (A.1), α is a complex number and the coherent state defined forms a double
continuum corresponding to the continuous ranges of values of the real and imaginary
part of α. It may be easily verified that the state |α〉 is normalized:
〈α|α〉 = e−|α|2
∞∑
m,n=0
α∗
m
αn√
m!
√
n!
〈m|n〉
= e−|α|
2
∞∑
m,n=0
α∗
m
αn√
m!
√
n!
δm,n
= e−|α|
2
∞∑
n=0
|α|2n
n!
= e−|α|
2
e|α|
2
= 1 (A.2)
An important fact about coherent states is that, differently from the |n〉 states, they
are not necessarily orthogonal:
〈α|β〉 = exp
[
−1
2
|α|2 − 1
2
|β|2
] ∞∑
n=0
α∗
n
βn
n!
= exp
[
−1
2
|α|2 − 1
2
|β|2 + α∗β
]
(A.3)
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This way, the |α〉 state in Eq. (A.1) is eigenstate of the destruction operator with
eigenvalue α:
aˆ |α〉 = e−|α|2/2
∞∑
n=1
αn√
n!
√
n |n− 1〉
= e−|α|
2/2
∞∑
n=1
αn√
(n− 1)! |n− 1〉
= e−|α|
2/2
∞∑
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉
= α |α〉 (A.4)
Using the relations that define the destructive and creation operator
aˆ |n〉 = √n |n− 1〉 (A.5)
aˆ† |n〉 = √n+ 1 |n+ 1〉 (A.6)
Eq. (A.1) becomes:
|α〉 = e−|α|2/2
∞∑
n=0
(
αaˆ†
)n
n!
|0〉 = exp
[
αaˆ† − 1
2
|α|2
]
|0〉 (A.7)
Generally this result is rewritten in a more compact form:
|α〉 = Dˆ(α) |0〉 (A.8)
where the “coherent state displacement” operator
Dˆ(α) = exp
(
αaˆ† − α∗aˆ) (A.9)
is equivalent to a creation operator for the complete state, analogous to the particle
number operator nˆ. The operator satisfies the following relations:
Dˆ†(α)Dˆ(α) = Dˆ(α)Dˆ†(α) = 1 (A.10)
Dˆ†(α)aˆDˆ(α) = aˆ+ α (A.11)
Dˆ†(α)aˆ†Dˆ(α) = aˆ† + α∗ (A.12)
The coherent state expectation value for the nˆ operator is obtained using properties
from Eqs. (A.4 - A.6):
〈n〉 = 〈α|nˆ|α〉 = 〈α|aˆ†aˆ|α〉 = |α|2 (A.13)
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Analogously the second momentum may be easily computed redefining the dependence
of nˆ on aˆ and aˆ† as following:
nˆ2 = aˆ†aˆaˆ†aˆ = aˆ†
(
aˆ†aˆ+ 1
)
aˆ = aˆ†aˆ†aˆaˆ+ aˆ†aˆ (A.14)
using Eq. (3.15). The result is:〈
n2
〉
=
〈
α|nˆ2|α〉 = |α|4 + |α|2 = 〈n〉2 + 〈n〉 (A.15)
and consequently:
(∆n)2 = |α|2 = 〈n〉 (A.16)
The projective measurement operators are used to calculate the probability of finding
n photons in the system:
P (n) = | 〈n|α〉 |2 (A.17)
obtaining:
P (n) = e−|α|
2 |α|2n
n!
= e−〈n〉
〈n〉n
n!
(A.18)
Eq. (A.18) is the Poisson distribution relative to 〈n〉 mean value. Fig. (A.1) shows
the distribution’s shape for different values of 〈n〉. As the mean value increases, the
distribution tends to a Gaussian.
Figure A.1: Poisson distributions for increasing mean values. The distributions tend to
a Gaussian as the mean value 〈n〉 increases.
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B Test statistics functions
For each binary sequence, an individual statistical test must produce at least one P-value.
P-values are based on the evaluation of special functions, which must be as accurate as
possible on the target platform. The NIST suite provides log files for each statistical test
reporting P-values with six digits of precision. However, if greater precision is desired,
it is possible to modify the code test in each statistical test accordingly. During the
testing phase, NIST commonly evaluates sequences on the order 106; hence, results are
based on this assumption. If the user wishes to choose longer sequence lengths, then
he should be aware that numerical computations may be inaccurate due to machine or
algorithmic limitations. Tab. (B.1) and Tab. (B.2) show sample parameter values and
corresponding special function values for illustrative purposes. Tab. (B.1) compares the
results for the upper incomplete gamma function for selected parameter values of a and
x. The definitions for the gamma function, Γ(z), and the upper Incomplete Gamma
Function, igamc (a, x), are defined, respectively, as:
Γ(z) =
∫ ∞
0
t(z−1)e−t dt (B.1)
igamc (a, x) ≡ Q(a, x) = Γ(a, x)
Γ(a)
=
1
Γ(a)
∫ ∞
x
t(a−1)e−t dt (B.2)
where Q(a, 0) = 1 and lim
x→∞
Q(a, x) = 0.
Since the algorithm used in the test suite implementation of the incomplete gamma
function is based on the numerical recipe codes, it is evident that the function is accurate
to at least the seventh decimal place. For large values of a, the precision will degrade,
as will confidence in the result (unless a computer algebra system is employed to ensure
high precision computations). Tab. (B.2) compares the results for the Complementary
Error Function for selected parameter values of x. The definition for the complementary
error function is:
erfc (z) =
2√
pi
∫ ∞
z
e−u
2
du (B.3)
To reduce the likelihood for obtaining an inaccurate P-value result, NIST has pre-
scribed recommended input parameters.
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Parameters Q(a, x)
a=x=600 0.4945710331
a=x=800 0.4952983876
a=x=1000 0.4957947558
a=x=10000 0.4986701917
a=x=100000 0.4995794778
a=x=1000000 0.4998670205
Table B.1: Selected input parameters for the Incomplete Upper Gamma FunctionQ(a, x)
and its values.
Parameter erfc (x)
x=0.00 1.000000000000000
x=0.50 0.479500122186953
x=1.00 0.157299207050285
x=1.50 0.033894853524689
x=2.00 0.004677734981047
x=2.50 0.000406952017445
x=3.00 0.000022090496999
x=3.50 0.000000743098372
Table B.2: Selected input parameters for the Complementary Error Function erfc (x)
and its values.
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C Example of conditioned probabilities
for 2 and 3 detectors
Tabs. (C.1) and (C.4) show the conditioned probabilities for l = 2 and l = 3 respectively
and n ≥ 1. Each row corresponds to a specific Sensitive-Insensitive configuration while
each column to a possible output for the given number of detectors l. It is straightforward
to see that each row sum up to unity. That is because summing each row is the same as
summing all conditioned probabilities for a given configuration over all possible outputs.
The relation follow directly from the very definition of conditioned probability:∑
x
PX|NT1T2...Tl(x|nt1t2 . . . tl) = 1
where PX|NT1T2...Tl(x|nt1t2 . . . tl) is the conditioned probability for a generic number of
detectors l and incoming photons n. Tabs. (C.2) and (C.3), instead, show the reduced
tables according to Chap. (8)
The case when n = 0 is simply a table with every entry zero except for the one in the
(2l − 1)th row and 1st column which is always 1. In fact, when no photons impinge on
the detectors, the probability of obtaining the output (0, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
), when all detectors
are insensitive, is exactly one.
Outputs
C
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
s
(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
(S S) 0
(
1
2
)n ( 1
2
)n
1− 2 ( 1
2
)n
(S I)
(
1
2
)n
0 1− ( 1
2
)n
0
(I S)
(
1
2
)n
1− ( 1
2
)n
0 0
(I I) 1 0 0 0
Table C.1: Conditioned probabilities for l = 2 and n ≥ 1 for all possible Sensitive-
Insensitive configurations and outputs.
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DETECTORS
Outputs
C
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
s
(0,0) (0,1) (1,1)
(S S) 0
(
1
2
)n
1− 2 ( 1
2
)n
(I S)
(
1
2
)n
1− ( 1
2
)n
0
(I I) 1 0 0
Table C.2: Conditioned probabilities for l = 2 and n ≥ 1 for reduced configurations and
outputs. To retrieve Tab. (C.1) is sufficient to create a new matrix with each
row and column repeated exactly
(
l
s
)
and
(
l
u
)
times respectively, where s is
the number of sensitive detector for the specific configuration while u is the
number of 1s relative to a given output. As illustrated in Chap. (8), the new
table has l + 1 rows and columns.
Outputs
C
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
s
(0,0,0) (0,0,1) (0,1,1) (1,1,1)
(S S S) 0
(
1
3
)n ( 2
3
)n (
1− 2 ( 1
2
)n)
3
(
1
3
)n − 3 ( 2
3
)n
+ 1
(I S S)
(
1
3
)n ( 1
3
)n
(2n − 1) 1− 2 ( 2
3
)n
+
(
1
3
)n
0
(I I S)
(
2
3
)n
1− ( 2
3
)n
0 0
(I I I) 1 0 0 0
Table C.3: Conditioned probabilities for l = 3 and n ≥ 1 for reduced configurations and
outputs. To retrieve Tab. (C.4) is sufficient to create a new matrix with each
row and column repeated exactly
(
l
s
)
and
(
l
u
)
times respectively, where s is
the number of sensitive detector for the specific configuration while u is the
number of 1s relative to a given output. As illustrated in Chap. (8), the new
table has l + 1 rows and columns.
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D Matlab code
%--------------------------------------------------------------------------
%Computation of Conditioned min-Entropy for the generalized model including
%Dark count, Crosstalk and Afterpulsing effects
%--------------------------------------------------------------------------
mu = 5.47; %efficiency (5.47% for LASER - 41.4% for LED)
mu = mu/100;
alphamin = 0;
alphamax = 35;
alpha step = .5;
start dec = 3;
end dec = 16;
count t = 0;
prob dark = 0.204; %Dark count probability
prob cross = 9.67*10ˆ-5; %Crosstalk probability
prob puls = 0.0429; %Afterpulsing probability
prob = 1 - (1-prob dark)*(1-prob cross)*(1-prob puls); %total probability
l step = .01;
total = zeros(floor(prob/l step) + 1,1,...
(alphamax-alphamin)/alpha step + 1,end dec-start dec + 1);
for t = start dec:end dec
count t = count t + 1;
%------------------------------------------------------
%Extract the photon matrices for different values of n
%------------------------------------------------------
if t <= 9
string 1 = strcat('F:\Laboratorio\photons\00',num2str(t),'riv\');
cd(string 1);
files = dir(strcat('riv 0',num2str(t),' *.dat'));
nchoosek files = dir(strcat('nchoosek ',num2str(t),'.dat'));
elseif t >= 10 && t <= 99
string 2 = strcat('F:\Laboratorio\photons\0',num2str(t),'riv\');
cd(string 2);
files = dir(strcat('riv ',num2str(t),' *.dat'));
nchoosek files = dir(strcat('nchoosek ',num2str(t),'.dat'));
elseif t >= 100
string 3 = strcat('F:\Laboratorio\photons\',num2str(t),'riv\');
cd(string 3);
files = dir(strcat('riv ',num2str(t),' *.dat'));
nchoosek files = dir(strcat('nchoosek ',num2str(t),'.dat'));
x
end
disp(['Analizing system with ' num2str(t) ' detectors............'])
count alpha = 0;
%------------------------------------------------------
%Execute system analysis for different values of
%incident photons mean (alpha)
%------------------------------------------------------
for alpha = alphamin:alpha step:alphamax
count alpha = count alpha + 1;
count l = 0;
for l = 0:l step:prob
count l = count l + 1;
branch1 = 0;
branch = 0;
disp(['Prob: ' num2str(count l) '/' num2str(...
floor(prob/l step) + 1)])
for a = 1:length(files)
file curr = files(a).name;
detectors = t;
file ID = fopen(files(a).name);
test table = fread(file ID,files(a).bytes,'double');
table = zeros(detectors+1);
count = 0;
for b =1:detectors+1:size(test table,1)
count = count + 1;
table(count,:) = test table(b:b+detectors,1);
end
clear tabella test
photons = a;
%------------------------------------------------------
%Create all possible active-inactive configurations
%for a given number of detectors
%------------------------------------------------------
goofy test = 0;
inactive = zeros(detectors+1,detectors);
for c = 2:detectors+1
goofy test = goofy test + 1;
for d = 1:goofy test
inactive(c,d) = 1;
end
end
maximum = 0;
xi
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%--------------------------------------------------------------------------
%Section for the Conditioned min-Entropy calculus
%--------------------------------------------------------------------------
prob max = zeros(size(table,1),1);
for e = 1:size(table,1)
prob max(e,1) = max(table(e,:));
end
file ID nchoosek = fopen(nchoosek files.name);
nchoosek table = fread(file ID nchoosek,...
nchoosek files.bytes,'double');
for f = 1:size(prob max,1)
maximum = maximum + prob max(f,1)*muˆ(sum(...
inactive(f,:)))*(1-l)ˆ(detectors-...
sum(inactive(f,:)))*lˆ(sum(inactive(f,:)))*...
nchoosek table(f,1);
end
%--------------------------------------------------------------------------
branch1 = maximum*poisspdf(photons,alpha);
branch = branch + branch1;
fclose('all');
clear ans
end
total(count l,1,count alpha,count t) = ...
-log2(poisspdf(0,alpha) + branch);
end
end
end
%------------------------------------------------------
%Calculate minimum over all possible values of "prob"
%given the condition "0 <= l <= prob"
%------------------------------------------------------
minimum dummy = min(total);
minimum(1:size(minimum dummy,3),1:size(minimum dummy,4)) = ...
minimum dummy(1,1,:,:);
clear minimo dummy
%------------------------------------------------------
%Plot the figure for all chosen detectors
%------------------------------------------------------
figure
plot(alphamin:alpha step:alphamax,minimum)
xii
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